Using international standards in elections: Council of Europe handbook for civil society organisations by Publication Collective & Driza Maurer, Ardita
Zurich Open Repository and
Archive
University of Zurich
Main Library
Strickhofstrasse 39
CH-8057 Zurich
www.zora.uzh.ch
Year: 2016
Using international standards in elections: Council of Europe handbook for
civil society organisations
Publication Collective; Driza Maurer, Ardita
Posted at the Zurich Open Repository and Archive, University of Zurich
ZORA URL: https://doi.org/10.5167/uzh-133980
Originally published at:
Publication Collective; Driza Maurer, Ardita (2016). Using international standards in elections: Council
of Europe handbook for civil society organisations. Strasbourg: Council of Europe.
T he handbook Using international election standards, drafted in collaboration with civil society organisations from the countries of the Eastern Partnership, is a response to the 
recommendation set out in the 2015 report by the Secretary 
General of the Council of Europe entitled State of democracy, 
human rights and the rule of law in Europe. Its purpose is to improve 
the quality of domestic observation of electoral processes in the 
member states and to serve as a reference for domestic observers, 
primarily for core team members. 
At the same time, it may serve as a training tool for long-term 
and short-term observers and other electoral stakeholders 
who wish to familiarise themselves with international election 
standards (government officials, electoral administration, party 
representatives, judges, lawyers). 
The Council of Europe is convinced that this handbook will further 
promote the uniform application of Europe’s electoral heritage 
and of other international standards in its member states and 
beyond.
PR
EM
S 
09
29
16
ENG
Council of Europe 
http://book.coe.int
ISBN 978-92-871-8297-5
€19/US$38
The Council of Europe is the continent’s leading human rights 
organisation. It comprises 47 member states, 28 of which are 
members of the European Union. All Council of Europe member 
states have signed up to the European Convention on Human 
Rights, a treaty designed to protect human rights, democracy and 
the rule of law. The European Court of Human Rights oversees 
the implementation of the Convention in the member states.
www.coe.int
The European Union is a unique economic and political partnership between 
28 democratic European countries. Its aims are peace, prosperity and freedom 
for its 500 million citizens – in a fairer, safer world. To make things happen, 
EU countries set up bodies to run the EU and adopt its legislation. The main 
ones are the European Parliament (representing the people of Europe), the 
Council of the European Union (representing national governments) and 
the European Commission (representing the common EU interest).
http://europa.eu
USING INTERNATIONAL 
ELECTION STANDARDS
Council of Europe handbook
for civil society organisations
U
SIN
G
 IN
TERN
ATIO
N
A
L ELECTIO
N
 STA
N
D
A
RD
S

USING INTERNATIONAL 
ELECTION STANDARDS
Council of Europe handbook 
for civil society organisations
Council of Europe
This document was produced 
with the financial assistance of the European 
Union. The views expressed herein 
can in no way be taken to represent 
the official opinion of the European Union
The opinions expressed in this work are 
the responsibility of the authors and 
do not necessarily reflect the official 
policy of the Council of Europe.
All rights reserved. No part of this 
publication may be translated, reproduced 
or transmitted, in any form or by any 
means, electronic (CD-Rom, internet, etc.) 
or mechanical, including photocopying, 
recording or any information storage 
or retrieval system, without prior 
permission in writing from the Directorate 
of Communication (F-67075 Strasbourg 
Cedex or publishing@coe.int).
Cover photo: Council of Europe 
Cover design: Documents and Publications 
Production Department (SPDP), 
Council of Europe 
Layout: Draconic, Paris
Council of Europe Publishing 
F-67075 Strasbourg Cedex 
http://book.coe.int
ISBN 978-92-871-8297-5 
© Council of Europe, November 2016 
Printed at the Council of Europe
 ► Page 3
Contents
FOREWORD 5
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 7
INTRODUCTION 9
Elections – Cornerstone of democracy 9
Civil society organisations – Watchdogs for free and fair elections 10
Domestic election observers contributing to sustainable democracies 10
The handbook 11
PART 1 – ELECTION STANDARDS AND GENERAL PRINCIPLES 13
1. Definition 13
2. General principles 14
3. General conditions 16
4. Enforcement 17
5. The approach of civil society organisations 18
PART 2 – APPLICATION AND GOOD PRACTICES 21
1. Electoral system 21
2. Electoral administration 30
3. Voter education 35
4. Voter registration 39
5. Candidate registration 46
6. Election campaign 54
7. Media coverage of the elections 64
8. Voting – Types of voting 73
9. Counting and results management 82
10. Electoral complaints 90
11. Election observation 96
APPENDICES 101

 ► Page 5
Foreword
T he right to free elections is guaranteed under the European Convention on Human Rights. Of all the democratic safeguards against the abuse of political power, it is one of the most fundamental. The ability of individuals to express 
their identities and choices peacefully, at the ballot box, is central to stability in any 
society, and so to Europe’s democratic security too.
The tasks performed by election observers are therefore extremely important. Elections 
must be prepared with diligence and integrity, and observers must perform their duties 
in an unbiased and transparent manner. Their presence and professionalism helps ensure 
the confidence of voters, as well as of the international community. The Council of 
Europe and our partner organisations therefore strive to assist organisations conducting 
observations to do so to the highest standards.
This handbook draws on methods for electoral assistance developed by our Organisation 
over many years. It aims to help observers to become more efficient and to produce 
reports which are more effective. Our starting point is that, far from watching passively 
from the sidelines, observers play an active role in developing national electoral pro-
cedures through their advice and recommendations. It is therefore vital that mission 
reports and advice issued to national authorities are easily understood and can be 
translated into concrete action. There are also a number of important principles to which 
we believe observers should pay special attention during an election, including the 
participation of women, young people, national minorities and people with disabilities.
This new edition will, I believe, provide organisations engaged in these activities with 
a practical, useable guide, reflecting decades of relevant experience and supporting 
them in their invaluable work.
Thorbjørn Jagland
Secretary General of the Council of Europe
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Introduction
ELECTIONS – CORNERSTONE OF DEMOCRACY
T he Council of Europe was set up with the aim to achieve greater unity among its members for the purpose of safeguarding the ideals and principles that form the basis of genuine democracy. Since its creation in 1949, a number of legal texts 
have been adopted with a view to interpreting the notion of “genuine democracy”. 
Elections, in this respect, are a cornerstone of democratic regimes and therefore a 
prerequisite for accession to the Council of Europe. This idea is well reflected in the 
Parliamentary Assembly report titled “For more democratic elections”, prepared by 
Jean-Charles Gardetto, which cites the Kiev Forum for the Future of Democracy:
The Council of Europe’s objective is to establish a common understanding about all the 
principles which qualify elections as being “free and fair” in compliance with democratic 
standards. Those standards must be fully implemented in all elections throughout the 
Council of Europe space and in those States aspiring to join the Organisation or engage 
in a privileged relationship with it.
Though the existence of democratic institutions as a precondition for joining the 
Council of Europe is not expressly mentioned in Articles 3 and 4 of the Statute of the 
Council of Europe, a decision on whether a state can join the Organisation relies on 
the respect of elementary democratic standards. Failure to respect human rights and 
democratic principles may entail a suspension of the accession process, as was the case 
for Belarus, which had special invitee status to the Council of Europe between 1992 
and 1997. A general conclusion of the Gardetto report is that commonly accepted 
democratic principles should apply in each election that takes place in Council of 
Europe member states or those states that wish to become members or engage in a 
privileged relationship with the Organisation.
The Council of Europe, through its institutions and bodies such as the European Court of 
Human Rights, the Parliamentary Assembly, the European Commission for Democracy 
through Law (Venice Commission) and its Council for Democratic Elections, the Group 
of States against Corruption and the Division of Electoral Assistance, plays a key role in 
the creation of Europe’s electoral heritage and standards. In turn, civil society organi-
sations (CSOs) contribute to enhancing European standards and good practices by 
providing vital links between policy, standards and reality. Their role is crucial during 
election time, and particularly between elections.
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CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANISATIONS – WATCHDOGS FOR FREE AND 
FAIR ELECTIONS
Council of Europe instruments and policies have long provided a solid basis for and 
significant encouragement to enhancing the roles and responsibilities of CSOs in 
decision making and actions. In the 2014 Council of Europe report on the state of 
democracy, human rights and the rule of law in Europe, the Secretary General pointed 
out that whereas improvements both in electoral legislation and practice have taken 
place in most member states of the Council of Europe, a number of problems recur 
in the implementation of the standards of European electoral heritage, as defined in 
the Venice Commission’s Code of Good Practice in Electoral Matters (2002). The report 
goes on to say that proper election observation makes election violations public and 
therefore more difficult to accomplish and encourages reciprocal election observation, 
providing the opportunity for member states to learn from each other. The report also 
recommended improving the quality of domestic observation of electoral processes.
DOMESTIC ELECTION OBSERVERS CONTRIBUTING TO 
SUSTAINABLE DEMOCRACIES
Over the last few years, the importance of domestic election observation has grown 
significantly. Domestic observers cover the entire election process from beginning to 
end, including the pre-electoral period, election day and the post-election period. They 
are familiar with local languages and customs, understand the political environment, 
are able to follow in detail specific election procedures, and are multipliers of electoral 
values in their societies. Furthermore, observers follow up on election-related cases, 
come up with action plans for further improvement of the election process and monitor 
whether key stakeholders take recommendations into consideration between elections. 
Their observations are vital for the transparency of the electoral process in three ways:
 ► gathering information and documenting facts about the election process;
 ► assessing the facts/information in order to understand to what degree elections 
are held in compliance with international standards;
 ► engaging in implementation of the recommendations of international election 
observation missions, thus contributing to the reform process in post-election 
periods.
Domestic observers are becoming increasingly specialised and professional, and con-
tribute to promoting confidence in the electoral process – and in the long run to the 
sustainability of democracy. The structure of domestic election observation missions 
has improved in recent years with strong teams composed of core team analysts, long-
term observers and short-term observers, each receiving equal attention in Council of 
Europe training programmes.
While many domestic observers have become more professional and as a consequence 
more influential, there is a constant need for upgrading to respond to new trends 
in the field of elections. These include novel interpretations by the European Court 
of Human Rights (the Court) of Article 3 on free and fair elections of the Protocol to 
the European Convention on Human Rights, new electoral standards, and the chan-
ging practice of states.
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THE HANDBOOK
This handbook, drafted in collaboration with CSOs from the countries of the Eastern 
Partnership, is a response to the recommendation set out in the 2015 report by the 
Secretary General of the Council of Europe on the state of democracy, human rights 
and the rule of law in Europe, aimed at improving the quality of domestic observation 
of electoral processes in the member states.
The handbook serves as a reference for domestic observers, primarily for core team 
members. At the same time, it may serve as a training tool for long-term and short-term 
observers and other electoral stakeholders who wish to familiarise themselves with 
international election standards (e.g. government officials, electoral administration, 
party representatives, judges, lawyers).
The handbook is divided into two parts, providing a brief introduction to the very 
concept of international standards and then proceeding to their application in elec-
tion reporting.
The first part, “Election standards and general principles”, presents different types of 
international standards and commitments as well as international “soft law”, including 
general principles and good practices in electoral matters and how they relate to each 
other. The second part, “Application and good practices”, focuses on specific principles 
of each aspect of the electoral process: starting from election systems and election 
administrations, continuing with registration of voters and contestants as well as elec-
tion campaigns and media coverage, covering specific voter categories (e.g. internally 
displaced persons, refugees, prisoners, minorities, women), and concluding with voting, 
counting, tabulation and appeal procedures.
The Council of Europe is convinced that this report, “Using international election stand-
ards – Council of Europe handbook for civil society organisations”, will further promote 
uniform application of Europe’s electoral heritage and of other international standards 
in its member states and beyond.
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Part 1
Election standards 
and general principles
1. DEFINITION
T he term “international election standards and good practices” as used in the present handbook encompasses provisions found in different types of documents.
From a geographical point of view two types of standards and good practices can be 
differentiated:
 – international: those of the 1948 United Nations Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (UDHR) and the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR), including interpretations of the ICCPR by the Human Rights 
Committee in the form of General Comments.1 The UDHR is not a treaty, but 
several of its provisions are universally accepted and considered to be customary 
international law;
 – regional: those of the 1950 Council of Europe Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (the Convention) and its additional 
Protocol 1.
From the perspective of their binding force on states, the standards and practices 
included in this handbook encompass:
 – legally binding treaties (e.g. ICCPR, the Convention);
 – soft law, which includes politically binding commitments such as the 1990 
Copenhagen Document from the Organization for Security and Co-operation 
in Europe (OSCE), interpretative documents such as the ICCPR’s General 
Comment 25, and international good practice such as the Venice Commission’s 
Code of Good Practice on Electoral Matters (Code of Good Practice) and the OSCE/
Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) election monitoring 
observation reports and their recommendations.
1. The UN Human Rights Committee was established by the ICCPR. The covenant sets out the legal 
basis of the committee in treaty form, considers it a treaty body and obliges states parties to respect 
its authority.
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The standards and good practices mentioned in this handbook are closely linked to other 
election-related rights to be found in the documents mentioned above. These include 
freedom of opinion and expression, freedom of peaceful assembly, freedom of associa-
tion, freedom of movement, freedom from discrimination, and the right to an effective 
legal remedy, among others.
Finally, the standards and good practices are consistent with other universal or regional 
human rights instruments that include specific provisions on the electoral rights of 
specific groups (e.g. women, minorities, persons with disabilities, internally displaced 
persons and refugees) and the corresponding election-related obligations of states.2
2. GENERAL PRINCIPLES
The international election standards and good practices mentioned in this handbook 
stem from the following provisions:
 – UDHR, Article 21: 
(1) Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country, directly or 
through freely chosen representatives
…
(3) The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government; this will 
shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal and 
equal suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedures;
 – ICCPR, Article 25:
Every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity, without any … distinctions … 
and without unreasonable restrictions:
(a) To take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely chosen 
representatives;
(b) To vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections which shall be by universal 
and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret ballot, guaranteeing the free expression 
of the will of the electors;
(c) To have access, on general terms of equality, to public service in his country;
 – the European Convention of Human Rights, Article 3 of Protocol No. 1:
Parties undertake to hold free elections at reasonable intervals by secret ballot, under 
conditions which will ensure the free expression of the opinion of the people in the 
choice of the legislature;
 – OSCE (formerly CSCE), Copenhagen Document of the Human Dimension of the 
CSCE (1990), in particular paras. 5 to 8.
The following sections present general questions to be considered when examining 
the implementation of the main principles3 for democratic elections within the Council 
of Europe and the OSCE region. It is the implementation of these principles that is 
monitored by domestic and international election observers.
2. A detailed list of such instruments can be found in the European Commission’s 2007 compendium 
of international standards for elections, available at www.eueom.eu/files/dmfile/compendium-of-
int-standards-for-elections_en.pdf, accessed 13 July 2016.
3. A detailed description of the content of these principles can be found in the Venice Commission’s 
Code of Good Practice in Electoral Matters, in particular the Explanatory Report.
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a. Universal suffrage
Universal suffrage guarantees all eligible citizens the right to vote and to stand for 
election and the possibility to exercise these rights. CSOs could consider the follow-
ing questions:
 – is “universal” suffrage interpreted in terms that are as inclusive as possible? It is 
understood that a specific relationship between the individual and the country 
in question (e.g. citizenship) may be required;
 – the right to vote can be restricted under certain well-defined conditions, usually 
based on age, nationality, residence and mental capacity. Is this the case?
 – which other restrictions to the usual ones based on age, nationality, residence 
and mental capacity are applied? The fulfilment of formal conditions such as 
knowledge of a national language or payment of an electoral deposit (to stand 
in elections) may apply.
The conditions for depriving individuals of the right to stand may be less strict than for 
disenfranchising them, as it may be legitimate to debar persons whose activities in a 
public office would violate a greater public interest (Venice Commission 2002: para. 6).
b. Equal suffrage
CSOs could consider the following questions:
 – do all electors have the same number of votes, also known as the “one voter-one 
vote” principle? Is multiple voting effectively prevented in law and practice?
 – is the state impartial towards candidates and parties? Does it ensure equality 
of opportunity? This applies in particular to electoral campaigns, coverage by 
the media (especially publicly owned media) and to public funding of parties 
and campaigns;
 – are constituency boundaries drawn in such a way that seats in the chambers 
representing the people are distributed equally among the constituencies, 
in accordance with defined criteria (which may be the number of residents, 
the number of registered electors or the number of people actually voting)? 
In the European electoral tradition, equal suffrage also means equal voting 
power. The Venice Commission’s Code of Good Practice provides detailed 
explanations. It should, however, be noted that the right to equal voting power 
has not, so far, been enforced by the European Court of Human Rights;
 – are there any positive measures in place in order to ensure minimum representation 
for minorities or equality and parity of the sexes? Are they implemented?
c. Free suffrage
Free suffrage comprises free formation of the elector’s opinion and free expression of 
this opinion. CSOs could consider the following questions:
 – do voters have the freedom to form an opinion? Does the state respect the 
equal opportunity principle, especially in relation to mass media, billposting, 
the right to demonstrate, and the funding of parties and candidates? Is freedom 
of expression and, particularly, freedom of political debate respected?
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 – are voters free to express their wishes? Are voting procedures strictly observed? 
Is electoral fraud combated? Are voting procedures such as postal voting, proxy 
voting, mechanical and electronic voting, voting for expatriates, counting and 
transferring of results organised in accordance with the free suffrage principle? 
Are the results of the ballot accurately assessed?
d. Secret suffrage
CSOs could consider the following questions:
 – are voters protected from any form of coercion or compulsion to disclose how 
they intend to vote or how they voted?
 – are voters protected from any unlawful or arbitrary interference with the voting 
process?
 – are voters respecting the secrecy of suffrage? Is voting individual? Is family voting 
or any other form of control by one voter over the vote of another prohibited? 
Are conditions for allowing proxy voting strict enough?
e. Direct suffrage
CSOs could consider the following questions:
 – is at least one of the chambers of the national parliament elected through direct 
universal vote by the people?
 – is at least one chamber of the sub-national legislative bodies, or local councils, 
elected by direct suffrage?
f. Periodic elections
CSOs could consider the following question:
 – is the interval between elections usual (four to five years)? A longer interval, 
though no longer than seven years, may be considered for presidential elections.
3. GENERAL CONDITIONS
States should guarantee general conditions for the conduct of the democratic election 
process, in particular:
 – respect for fundamental rights: this includes respect for the freedom of expression 
and of the press, freedom of assembly and association for political purposes, 
freedom of movement inside the country, and the right of nationals to return 
to their country at any time. Restrictions to fundamental rights must be based 
in law, taken in the general interest and respect the principle of proportionality;
 – stability of electoral law: this covers mainly the stability of the more fundamental 
rules of electoral law, especially those covering the electoral system per se, 
the composition of electoral commissions and the drawing of constituency 
boundaries – three elements that are often regarded as decisive factors in 
election results. Legislation on such decisive factors should not change just 
before (less than one year previous to) elections;
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 – procedural guarantees: this includes the organisation of elections by an impartial 
body, the observation of elections, an effective system of appeal, the organisation 
and operation of polling stations, the funding of campaigns and parties, and 
issues of security (see below, Part 2).
The above-mentioned conditions are not absolute. States have a margin of apprecia-
tion when introducing restrictions for the exercise of political rights. This implies that 
any electoral legislation must be assessed in the light of the political evolution of the 
country concerned. Features that would be unacceptable in the context of one sys-
tem may be justified in another. Limitations to states’ margin of appreciation could be 
considered through the following questions:
 – do conditions or restrictions imposed respect the free expression of the people 
in the choice of the legislature? They must reflect (and not run counter to) the 
concern to maintain the integrity and effectiveness of an electoral procedure 
aimed at identifying the will of the people through universal suffrage;
 – do conditions or restrictions respect the principle of legality? They should 
be written in clear terms and should be published in time, ensuring that 
foreseeability is satisfied;
 – do conditions or restrictions pursue a legitimate aim? It is up to the concerned 
government to explain what the aim is;
 – do conditions or restrictions respect the principle of proportionality? As a 
general rule, individualised measures are to be preferred to large restrictions. 
With the passing of time, general restrictions on electoral rights become more 
difficult to justify. Any restriction on electoral rights should not be such as to 
exclude some persons or groups of persons from participating in the political 
life of the country.
4. ENFORCEMENT
With regards to the possibilities of judicial enforcement, the international electoral 
standards and good practices mentioned in this handbook include:
 – provisions the judicial enforcement of which can be invoked before national 
courts (self-executing treaty provisions);4
 – provisions that can furthermore be enforced internationally (e.g. through 
the Convention);
 – provisions the judicial enforcement of which cannot be directly sought before 
courts, namely those considered part of soft law.
In Europe, international judicial enforcement is possible only for the Convention (and 
its protocols). The Strasbourg Court’s case law thus plays a fundamental role in inter-
preting, evaluating and enforcing the implementation of the Convention’s electoral 
obligations (which are quite similar to those found in universal instruments). The last 
type of provision can nevertheless become binding for a state if and when courts con-
sider them to reflect good practice and include them in a judicial decision. For example, 
4. Once a state has signed and ratified a treaty it is legally bound and required to implement it in 
national law.
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several decisions of the Court refer to provisions found in Venice Commission docu-
ments, or recommendations and resolutions of the Parliamentary Assembly or the 
Committee of Ministers, which are often considered to be soft law.
In Council of Europe member states, individuals may file a complaint with the Court 
to redress election violations, after having exhausted domestic remedies. The Court’s 
decisions contribute to the interpretation of election-related provisions, including 
in other relevant Council of Europe conventions. The judgments are indicative to all 
Council of Europe member states, which are encouraged to take them into considera-
tion, but they are binding on the member state that is the subject of the judgment. 
The adoption of the necessary execution measures is supervised by the Committee 
of Ministers of the Council of Europe, made up of representatives of the governments 
of the 47 member states.
Judicial enforcement of the rights derived from the other international documents men-
tioned above is only possible through national courts. Limited international enforcement 
is possible for the ICCPR and is provided through the UN Human Rights Committee, 
the monitoring body. The committee can consider individual complaints on alleged 
breaches of the ICCPR in respect to any country (including Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, 
Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine) that has ratified the First Optional Protocol to the ICCPR 
(ICCPR-OP1) on individual communication procedure.5
5. THE APPROACH OF CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANISATIONS
CSOs engaged in election observation activities should refer to international election 
standards and good practices as benchmarks for evaluating and improving national 
standards and practices. Reference to international standards is thus closely linked to 
the monitoring of national standards and practices.
When reporting on elections and making reference to international standards, CSOs 
need to:
 ► be transparent both internally and externally about the benchmarks used;
 ► provide adequate training to their members about relevant:
 – national electoral legislation and practice: standards, practices and 
enforcement possibilities;
 – national obligations at the international level concerning elections, including 
their enforcement possibilities;
 – international soft law on election issues and options for their implementation.
When observing the implementation of international standards CSOs need to:
 ► build knowledge on both national legislation and international standards 
and good practices in order to properly evaluate national frameworks and 
practice against international ones and to elaborate recommendations for 
improving them;
5. The Centre for Civil and Political Rights works to promote the participation of CSOs in the work of 
the UN Human Rights Committee, available at www.ccprcentre.org/individual-communications, 
accessed 13 July 2016.
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 ► build knowledge on monitoring the implementation of standards and practices. 
This includes building capacities to:
 – assess problems of implementation of international standards and good 
practices in national regulations and practice and issue recommendations 
for addressing these problems;
 – follow up on the implementation of recommendations and report on it 
(including by reporting to the UN Human Rights Committee, as they are 
encouraged to do).
 ► build knowledge of judicial enforcement possibilities, both of national legislation 
and of international standards and practices. CSOs may consider:
 – bringing a case for judicial enforcement before the national courts;
 – initiating activities to bring a case for judicial enforcement before the Court 
(after exhausting national remedies).
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Part 2
Application and 
good practices
1. ELECTORAL SYSTEM
T he electoral system plays a fundamental role as it provides a frame, setting the procedural rules for the casting of votes and their translation into seats won by parties and candidates. It thus determines the relationship between the 
electorate and the elected institutions. This part of the handbook deals with the 
basic characteristics of an electoral system such as the choice of the electoral system 
by a state as well as the existing elements and types. The emphasis lies in the two 
last sub-sections, which deal in more detail with the non-discriminatory character 
and the conditions of the legal framework regulating the type of electoral system.
a. Choice of electoral system
International law does not prescribe any electoral system (UN Human Rights 
Committee 1981-2014: General Comment (GC) 25, para. 21). It rather recognises 
that there is no electoral system equally suited to all states. A country’s choice of 
electoral system should be respected as a matter for national determination (Venice 
Commission 2002: Guidelines, section II.4). Each electoral system has its own distinct 
peculiarities, depending on the political and historical context of the country it is 
applied in (Venice Commission 2010).
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The European Court of Human Rights gives a wide margin of appreciation to the state 
in dealing with this issue, as reflected in its ruling concerning the case Saccomanno 
and Others v. Italy of 13 March 2012.
The electoral system must guarantee the free expression of the will of the electors 
(UN Human Rights Committee 1981-2014: GC 25, para. 21). An electoral system should 
also encourage political pluralism, and consider the interests of marginalised groups 
(OSCE/ODIHR 2003a: para. 2.4). Additionally, it should strive for universal representation 
in elected bodies and support direct elections (at least for one chamber of the national 
legislative body) (International IDEA 2014a: 71). To sum up, an electoral system must 
conform to human rights standards (Venice Commission 2002: Guidelines, section 
II.1.a) and voting principles, as stated in the first part of this handbook.
Most notably, equal suffrage must be granted, best described via the principle “one 
person, one vote” (European Commission 2008: 32). Where there are electoral systems 
in which the elector has more than one vote this means that all electors should have 
the same number of votes (Venice Commission 2002: Explanatory Report, para. 12). In 
addition, equal suffrage comprises as accurately as possible an equal weight of votes 
(The Carter Center 2014: 19).
b. Elements of the electoral systems
Electoral systems are defined as “the set of procedural rules governing the expression of 
votes cast in a given election and their conversion into seats” (Venice Commission 2013: 159). 
Two main categories determining electoral systems can be distinguished.
The first category establishes aspects concerning the organisation and conduct of 
elections such as the type of suffrage (direct, indirect, multi-tiered elections); the guiding 
principle the vote is based upon (is a majoritarian, proportional or mixed system 
applied?); the ballot structure (does the voter vote for a candidate or a party list? 
Wide margin of appreciation by states (the Court’s case law)
Facts: the case Saccomanno and Others v. Italy concerned in particular the closed list system. 
The applicants complained that they had not been able to express their preference for a 
candidate in the parliamentary elections since Italian law did not permit the direct elec-
tion of representatives by voters (it prescribes the submission by political parties of “closed” 
candidate lists: the order of candidates elected on a list is established by the party itself and 
voters cannot express their preference for any particular candidate).
Decision on the admissibility: considering the “wide margin of appreciation enjoyed by 
the States in this regard and the need to assess electoral legislation as a whole in the light 
of political developments and on the basis of the country’s historical and political context”, 
the Court held that the closed list system had not been in breach of Article 3 of Protocol No. 
1 (right to free elections).
Source: Saccomanno and Others v. Italy (13 March 2012).
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{“itemid”:[“001-62855”]}
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Does the voter make a single choice or is s/he expressing a series of preferences?); and 
the electorate’s division among constituencies/electoral districts (how many voters 
live in a district?).
The second category entails provisions for the translation of votes counted into seats 
gained by a candidate or party. This comprises the electoral formula (what mathemati-
cal formula is used to calculate the seat distribution and allocation? How are thresholds 
determined? How are the seats distributed among constituencies/among various lists/
within lists?).
c. Types of electoral systems
According to how proportionately they translate votes cast by voters into seats won 
by parties, electoral systems are often divided into three main types (International 
IDEA 2014a: 70), though there is a virtually unlimited number of voting methods within 
these major types:
 – majoritarian systems typically prioritise local representation via the use of small, 
single-member electoral districts (one seat per constituency). In order to win, 
a candidate must either reach a simple majority (most votes cast in his or her 
favour) or an absolute majority (more than 50% of the votes cast) (European 
Commission 2008: 31);
 – proportional systems typically use larger multi-member districts (more than 
one seat per electoral district). Seats are distributed proportionally according 
to electoral formulae (ibid.) (divisor methods enabling seats allocation in one 
operation, e.g. the D’Hondt method or the Saint-Laguë method; divisor methods 
for seats allocation in two stages, e.g. the Droop quota, Hagenbach-Bischoff 
quota or the Hare quota (first stage) and the largest remainder method, strongest 
lists method or the highest average method (second stage for distribution of 
the remaining seats));
 – mixed systems offer yet other approaches, as well as various combinations of 
majoritarian and proportional models (such as electing one part of the legislature 
by a proportional model and another from local districts).
d. Non-discriminatory legal framework
The legal framework should be non-discriminatory (The Carter Center 2014: 60), which 
means it should avoid interference with the voting principle of equal suffrage and 
the above-mentioned standard of universal representation. This is most significant in 
the fields of boundary delimitation, the setting of thresholds and the establishing of 
special measures.
Boundary delimitation
Boundary delimitation is necessary where elections are being held in more than one sin-
gle constituency (Venice Commission 2002: Explanatory Report, para. 13). While single -
member districts should be of the same size to guarantee the equal weight of all votes, 
in multi-member districts the number of representatives per constituency should be 
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decided in accordance with a specific criterion or a combination of several criteria 
such as the number of residents in the constituency, the number of resident nation-
als (including minors), the number of registered electors or possibly the number of 
people actually voting.
Hence, seats must be distributed in a clear and balanced way among the constituen-
cies. This should apply at least for national elections to lower houses of parliaments as 
well as regional and local elections. To draw boundaries the following allocation criteria 
can be applied: the size of the population, the number of residents, or the number of 
voters registered or (potentially) actually voting. The combination of these criteria is 
admissible. Boundaries can be further oriented towards geographical criteria, admin-
istrative boundaries or even historical boundaries (ibid.: Guidelines, section I.2.2). It is 
essential to avoid so-called “gerrymandering” – the drawing of electoral boundaries 
undertaken in such a way that certain more homogenous segments of the electorate 
are intentionally combined or divided to influence the outcome of an election. Groups 
with special interests should be considered in an appropriate way, like national minori-
ties, and should have a chance to gain a seat in a majoritarian system (OSCE 1999b 
Recommendations No. 9 and No. 10).
The Final Report of the OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission to 2014’s Early 
Parliamentary Elections in Ukraine brought up such an example (below).
According to the Venice Commission’s Code of Good Practice (2002), variances among 
constituencies or representatives and the number of voters should not be more than 10% 
from the average. They must not exceed 15% except where special circumstances exist 
like the protection of a locally concentrated minority or a thinly populated administrative 
Observation of boundary delimitation and national minorities (Ukraine)
Drawing the boundaries of single-mandate electoral districts should take into account the 
geographical distribution of national minorities. During the 2014 early parliamentary elections 
in Ukraine OSCE/ODIHR observers noted:
“Some national minority representatives also informed the OSCE/ODIHR EOM that they con-
sider themselves to have been disadvantaged in majoritarian contests. While Article 18 of the 
election law was amended in 2013 to incorporate recommendations that ethnic composition 
be taken into account when drawing the boundaries of single-mandate electoral districts, 
constituency boundaries were not redrawn before these elections. This prompted official 
protests from the Hungarian and Romanian minorities that the delimitation of electoral 
districts from 2012 in Zakarpattya and Chernivtsi oblasts respectively, would again prevent 
them from securing a majoritarian MP.”
The Mission therefore recommended that “if the current electoral system is retained, the 
CEC [central electoral commission] should complete the implementation of Article 18 of the 
election law regarding the delineation of single-mandate electoral districts well in advance 
of the next election cycle, and in full consultation with national minorities.”
Source: OSCE/ODIHR EOM to Ukraine, Early Parliamentary Elections 2014, Final Report, p. 22
www.osce.org/odihr/elections/ukraine/132556?download=true
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unit. Further, in order to ensure equal voting power, boundaries should be reviewed at 
least every 10 years. Multi-member constituencies should have boundaries that coincide 
with administrative boundaries. In case of variances in multi-member constituencies, 
the number of representatives for one constituency should be redefined.
Boundary delimitation should take place in a transparent and consistent manner, estab-
lished by a law that also regulates the frequency of reviewing boundaries (European 
Commission 2008: 32). It should underlie independent inquiry by CSOs, candidates, 
political parties or other electoral stakeholders and allocation criteria should be pub-
licly available (The Carter Center 2014: 59).
Thresholds
An electoral system can legally impose minimum thresholds that parties or candidates 
must reach in order to win a seat. However, unreasonably high thresholds may prevent 
parties from being elected (European Commission 2008: 32). This must not be done 
intentionally to exclude specific political parties or national minorities from represen-
tation. Moreover, high thresholds result in so-called “wasted votes”, which means that 
these voters’ choices are not considered.
The Court, in its judgment Yumak and Sadak v. Turkey of 8 July 2008, considered whether 
the threshold in the Turkish parliamentary elections is too high.
Electoral thresholds (the Court’s case law)
Facts: the applicants alleged that the electoral threshold of 10% imposed nationally for parlia-
mentary elections had interfered with the free expression of the opinion of the people in the 
choice of legislature (Turkish electoral law stipulated that to have representatives in parliament, 
a political party had to obtain at least 10% of votes nationally).
Law: the Court considered that in general a 10% electoral threshold appeared excessive, as such 
a threshold compelled political parties to make use of stratagems that did not contribute to the 
transparency of the electoral process: “In the present case, however, the Court is not persuaded 
that, when assessed in the light of the specific political context of the elections in question, and 
attended as it is by correctives and other safeguards which have limited its effects in practice, the 
threshold has had the effect of impairing in their essence the rights secured to the applicants by 
Article 3 of Protocol No. 1.” In detail, the Court identified the occurrence of protest votes due to pre-
vious economic and political crises in Turkey that penalised former governing parties in the 2002 
election. Correctives and safeguards exist in Turkey, for instance pre-electoral alliances of parties to 
overcome the threshold. These parties split up after being elected, or parties support independent 
candidates for whom the threshold does not apply. Additionally, the Turkish Constitution contains 
the principle of fair representation, which according to the Constitutional Court of Turkey has to 
be balanced with the aim to create stable governments. Thus, the Constitutional Court functions 
as a supervisory authority.
Conclusion: no violation of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 (right to free elections).
Source: Yumak and Sadak v. Turkey (8 July 2008).
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-87363#{“itemid”:[“001-87363”]}
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Special measures
Electoral law can include measures seeking to address traditionally existing imbalances 
in universal representation ((European Commission 2008). In principle, such measures 
do not go against the principle of equal suffrage (Venice Commission 2002: Guidelines, 
sections I.2.4.b, I.2.5). Those special measures may comprise quotas, reserved seats for 
specific groups, exemptions from quorum requirements or lower thresholds.
First of all, such measures should apply to women so as to enhance their participation 
in decision making in elected bodies and to achieve equal participation of men and 
women (Council of Europe 2013a: Strategic objective 4). Further, the Council of Europe’s 
Committee of Ministers in its Recommendation Rec(2003)3 on balanced participation 
of women and men in political and public decision making recommends that govern-
ments of member states:
 – promote balanced participation, meaning that representation of either women 
or men in any decision-making body in political life should not fall below 40%;
 – promote the equal civil and political rights of women and men, including those 
running for office;
 – promote and encourage special measures to stimulate and support women to 
participate in political decision making;
 – consider setting targets, with a timescale for delivery to reach balanced 
participation of women and men;
 – monitor and evaluate progress and report regularly on measures taken and 
progress made.
The ability of women to exercise their human rights and to participate fully in the 
electoral process depends on the social and cultural norms that exist in the country. 
In countries where women are generally unequal in everyday life they will be at a dis-
advantage in political participation as well. This may be particularly true for women 
from minority populations; those living in rural areas; victims of violence and/or human 
trafficking; and those who have been internally displaced.
This is why election observers will need to make an assessment not just of how the 
national legislation meets international standards but also of the reality of life for 
women. This may include assessing education, health care, employment opportunities 
and the justice system, as well as levels of violence, human trafficking and women’s 
economic independence.
Election reports should include information on:
 ► the number of women and men elected at parliamentary, regional and local level;
 ► the number of women and men elected by each political party;
 ► the success rate of women and men as candidates in getting elected.
This information, monitored over time at each election, can provide a measure of pro-
gress and indicate the success of any specific measures adopted.
Some states have introduced such measures as have been described above for national 
minorities. Additionally, states must permit parties representing national minorities 
(Venice Commission 2002: Guidelines, section I.2.4). Special measures can also apply for 
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people with special needs (such as people with disabilities) (The Carter Center 2014: 62). 
In the latter case their introduction should be subject to scrutiny to ensure that they 
do not lead to inequality.
It is important to note that under international law, such measures are not prohibited 
by the principle of non-discrimination themselves provided that there is an objective 
and reasonable justification for their application (proportionality principle) and that 
the measures do not run counter to other guaranteed human rights. Thus, special 
measures could be inadmissible if they themselves appear discriminatory.
This can be exemplified by the ruling of the European Court of Human Rights in the 
case of Sejdić and Finci v. Bosnia and Herzegovina of 22 December 2009.
e. Conditions of electoral law
The legislative framework for elections must be clear, unambiguous, detailed (yet not 
overly complex) and established by statutory law in order to provide certainty and 
predictability (OSCE/ODIHR 2003a: para. 2.5; European Commission 2008: 30). It has 
to be equally enforced and non-arbitrarily applied (The Carter Center 2014: 56). Voters 
and stakeholders can thereby understand the electoral system and their role in the 
elections, which creates public confidence in the process.
Discriminatory practice of reserved seats (the Court’s case law)
Facts: the applicants, who were both citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina, were of Roma 
and Jewish origin respectively, and held prominent public positions. The 1995 Constitution 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina included power-sharing provisions that provided – as a result 
of the peace negotiations after the Bosnian War to ensure peace – that the tripartite State 
Presidency and seats in the upper chamber of the State Parliament, the House of Peoples, 
be reserved for Bosniacs, Croats and Serbs only. The applicants complained that, despite 
possessing experience comparable to the highest elected officials in the country, they were 
prevented by the constitution from being candidates for such posts solely on the grounds 
of their ethnic origin.
Law: the Court reiterated that “discrimination means treating differently, without an objec-
tive and reasonable justification, persons in similar situations. ‘No objective and reasonable 
justification’ means that the distinction in issue does not pursue a ‘legitimate aim’ or that 
there is not a ‘reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means employed and 
the aim sought to be realised’ … Ethnicity and race are related concepts. … Discrimination 
on account of a person’s ethnic origin is a form of racial discrimination. … the maintenance 
of the system in any event does not satisfy the requirement of proportionality. … there exist 
mechanisms of power-sharing which do not automatically lead to the total exclusion of 
representatives of the other communities. … Thus, the Court concludes that the applicants’ 
continued ineligibility to stand for election to the House of Peoples of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
lacks an objective and reasonable justification”.
Conclusion: violation of Article 14 (prohibition of discrimination) in conjunction 
with Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 (right to free elections) and violation of Article 1 of 
Protocol No. 12 (general ban on discrimination).
Source: Sejdić and Finci v. Bosnia and Herzegovina (22 December 2009).
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-96491#{“itemid”:[“001-96491”]}
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The absence of such conditions can be legally challenged, as reflected in the ruling by 
the Court in the case Grosaru v. Romania of 2 March 2010.
Amendments to the law concerning the electoral system itself or boundary delimita-
tion may not be made less than one year before an election (Venice Commission 2002: 
Guidelines, section II.2.b). This ensures that all electoral stakeholders are able to fulfil 
their role (OSCE/ODIHR 2003a: para. 2.5). Exceptions may apply if serious deficiencies 
in the electoral law or its application have occurred and if there is public consensus 
that those have to be corrected (ibid.; Venice Commission 2005). Amendments made 
shortly before elections are acceptable if a rule states that such amendments will not 
apply to the next election but will enter into force afterwards (Venice Commission 2002: 
Explanatory Report, para. 66).
Clarity of electoral law (the Court’s case law)
Facts: the applicant stood as a candidate in the 2000 parliamentary elections for the seat reserved 
for Romania’s Italian minority. He was nominated as a candidate for one of the organisations 
representing the Italian minority, which, after the votes had been counted, was allocated the 
parliamentary seat, having gained a total of 21 263 votes at the national level. The organisation 
presented the applicant’s uninominal list in 19 of the country’s 42 constituencies. He was the 
candidate, having secured the largest number of votes at national level (5 624 votes). However, 
the seat was allocated to another candidate belonging to that organisation, who had stood on 
another uninominal list and had won only 2 943 votes, but in a single constituency. The applicant’s 
appeals to the Central Electoral Office and to the national courts were rejected on the grounds 
that seats were allocated on the basis, inter alia, of the order of the candidates on the organisa-
tion’s winning list.
Law: the Court observed that the election law does not set out clearly the procedure to be fol-
lowed in assigning the parliamentary seat set aside for the winning organisation representing a 
national minority. When referring to the largest number of votes, its text does not specify whether 
this is the largest number of votes at national level or at constituency level. However, such a detail 
may prove decisive when determining the winning candidate. The Court considered that “the lack 
of clarity of the electoral law as regards national minorities and the lack of sufficient guarantees 
as to the impartiality of the bodies responsible for examining the applicant’s challenges impaired 
the very essence of the rights guaranteed by Article 3 of Protocol No. 1…”
Conclusion: violation of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 (right to free elections).
Source: Grosaru v. Romania (2 March 2010).
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-97617#{“itemid”:[“001-97617”]}
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2. ELECTORAL ADMINISTRATION
A state’s electoral administration (EA) is responsible for the conduct of elections as 
well as for ensuring the participation of voters and the integrity of the whole electoral 
process. It consists of several levels, from the national EA with the central electoral 
commission (CEC) down to district or territorial electoral commissions and the polling 
station commission. The EA’s primary duties are determining who is eligible to vote, 
candidate registration, polling operations, and the counting and tabulating of votes. 
Additional tasks of the EA might be voter education, boundary delimitation or the 
settling of electoral disputes. States have a margin of appreciation in deciding which 
concrete tasks they allocate to the EA.
Aspects of independence, impartiality and permanence are specified under sub- 
section a., requirements for the formation of electoral management bodies (EMBs) are 
described in sub-section b. and good practices for EMBs are described in sub-section c.
a. Features of the electoral administration
An independent EA, which operates in a professional and impartial manner, is a key 
requirement for genuine elections: “An independent electoral authority should be 
established to supervise the electoral process and to ensure that it is conducted fairly, 
impartially and in accordance with established laws which are compatible with the 
Covenant” (UN Human Rights Committee 1981-2014: GC 25, para. 20).
However, the criteria of independence does not necessarily entail a separate institu-
tion established constitutionally and exclusively for elections (International IDEA 2006: 
paras. 15-22). In many member states of the Council of Europe the management 
of elections is entrusted to existing institutions, which are part of the government. 
Rather, independence means the EA should be independent from political interests 
(The Carter Center 2014: 69).
An example can be found in the OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission’s Final 
Report on the 2012 Parliamentary Elections in Belarus.
Independence of electoral administration (Belarus)
The EOM, in its Final Report, reviewed structure and appointment procedures for the elec-
tion administration, and assessed that the “role of the President in appointing senior election 
officials challenges the autonomy of the election administration. The current CEC Chairperson 
has held the position since 1996. During these elections, the Chairperson appeared regularly 
on television and presented her political views about the electoral process and its contest-
ants, which brought into question the impartiality of the commission’s work. All parties and 
candidates, except those represented in parliament, expressed a lack of confidence in the 
impartiality of the election administration.”
The OSCE/ODIHR EOM, in this regard, recommended: “The role of the President in appointing 
senior election officials to the Central Election Commission could be reconsidered so as to 
increase confidence in its independence and its impartial application of the Electoral Code.”
Source: OSCE/ODIHR EOM to Belarus, Parliamentary Elections 2012, Final Report, p. 6.
www.osce.org/odihr/98146?download=true
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Accordingly, the EMB should be administered separately from governmental institu-
tions where the administrative authorities’ independence from political stakeholders 
has not been established over the course of time (Venice Commission 2002: Guidelines, 
section II.3.1.b).
The independence of the EA should be legally guaranteed in a clear way (European 
Commission 2008: 37). Furthermore, EMB members must be able to act free from 
intimidation or threat to their safety (The Carter Center 2014: 75). The UN Human 
Rights Council (2012) adds that independence implies a separate budget determined 
by parliament that provides sufficient funding.
According to the Code of Good Practice, EMBs should be set up as permanent bodies 
(Venice Commission 2002: Guidelines, section II. 3.1.c). Where the EMB is established 
temporarily for the electoral period, it must be set up in a timely manner to implement 
the election procedure while preserving institutional memory across electoral cycles 
(European Commission 2008: 37; International IDEA 2006: para. 28).
b. Composition of EMBs
Concerning the recruitment of the EMB, states must put into place a transparent, 
efficient and equitable procedure (UN 2003: Article 7 (1)(a)). In addition, “to ensure 
access on general terms of equality, the criteria and processes for appointment, promo-
tion, suspension and dismissal must be objective and reasonable” (UN Human Rights 
Committee 1981-2014: GC 25, para. 23).
The official appointing body may be part of the executive, judiciary or parliament. 
The method for appointment should be laid out in the election legislation (OSCE/
ODIHR 2003b: 66). Otherwise, these bodies could unreasonably influence the compo-
sition of EMBs through the repeated rejection of nominees or their arbitrary removal.
The Code of Good Practice has specific requirements for the composition of central 
electoral commissions. They should include:
i. at least one member of the judiciary;
ii. representatives of parties already in parliament or having scored at least a given 
percentage of the vote; these persons must be qualified in electoral matters (Venice 
Commission 2002: Guidelines, section II.3.1.d).
Members should also be prohibited from campaigning, and political parties must be 
equally represented (either strictly or proportionally according to previous election results).
The latter requirement can be visualised in the Final Report of the OSCE/ODIHR Election 
Observation Mission to the 2013 Presidential Elections in Azerbaijan.
States can implement measures to increase the representation of marginalised groups 
in EMBs. Such special and temporary measures are reasonable for people with dis-
abilities and national minorities (International IDEA 1996: para. 6). However, it must be 
ensured that no inequality among groups arises as a result (The Carter Center 2014: 
74). The same procedure should apply to achieve de facto equality of women (UN 1979: 
GR 23, para. 15). At least 40% of EMB staff should represent the underrepresented sex 
(Committee of Ministers 2003a: Appendix).
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States should actively promote balanced participation on each level of the EMB as 
recommended in the Final Report by the OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission 
to the 2010 Parliamentary Elections in Azerbaijan.
EMB staff members should be politically neutral and must possess specialised skills regard-
ing elections in order to enable the EMB to organise them (Venice Commission 2002: 
Explanatory Report, para. 83). Members of electoral commissions at all levels of the EA 
must receive standardised training. This comprises training on the electoral process, 
international obligations and human rights standards.
To avoid influence by party interests the composition of EMBs should be regulated in the 
constitution or at least at a level higher than ordinary law (The Carter Center 2014: 70). 
Amendments should not be admissible less than one year before an election (Venice 
Commission 2002: Explanatory Report, paras. 65-6).
Last but not least, appointing bodies should not be free to recall the appointment of an 
EMB member, to ensure the independence of the body (ibid.: para. 77). EMB staff should 
be appointed for a reasonable time that should be longer than the term of office of the 
government. Thus, reappointment does not depend on each government or major-
ity interests (European Commission 2008: 37). Moreover, other arbitrary measures to 
exert pressure on EMB staff members should be avoided, such as cutting salaries for 
inconvenient decisions (International IDEA 2006: 99).
Impartiality in the composition of the Election Administration (Azerbaijan)
The OSCE/ODIHR EOM found that the set-up for election administration in the country under-
mines confidence in elections. Since “by law, chairpersons of all commissions are nominees 
of the parliamentary majority while secretaries represent the parliamentary minority and the 
independent deputies. The parliamentary majority therefore holds a de facto decision-making 
majority in all election commissions.”
Based on that, the EOM recommended: “The Election Code should be amended through an 
inclusive process to revise the composition of election commissions at all levels, with the aim 
of enhancing impartiality and public confidence in the work of the election administration.”
Source: OSCE/ODIHR EOM to Azerbaijan, Presidential Election 2013, Final Report, p. 7.
www.osce.org/institutions/110015?download=true
Representation of women in the electoral administration (Azerbaijan)
During the 2010 Parliamentary Elections in Azerbaijan the OSCE/ODIHR EOM noted that 
women were underrepresented at the top level of the EA although their representation had 
increased at the lower levels of the administration.
Based on that, the OSCE/ODIHR EOM recommended: “Parliament and state authorities should 
create the necessary conditions to promote and facilitate the inclusion of women in top 
government posts and in the higher levels of the election administration.”
Source: OSCE/ODIHR EOM to Azerbaijan, Parliamentary Elections 2010, Final Report, p. 27.
www.osce.org/odihr/elections/azerbaijan/75073?download=true
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c. Mode of operation of EMBs
States are required to ensure transparency in the electoral process. This includes trans-
parency of the EA while fulfilling its tasks, especially its decision-making process, legis-
lation process and operational procedures for the organisation of electoral events. For 
instance, the deadline of various procedures must be published so that it is possible to 
build an electoral calendar. The electoral information must be appropriately published 
to secure public understanding. In addition, meetings of the electoral administration 
should be open (also to media and party representatives) and tenders should be public 
and competitive (The Carter Center 2014: 71). Key principles guiding transparency are 
the right to information and the rule of law. Thus the EA has to act in conformity with law.
Furthermore, the EA has to act impartially to build public confidence in the body. To 
ensure impartiality and debate between the majority and at least parts of the minority, 
decisions of the electoral commission should require consensus or at least a qualified 
majority (e.g. two thirds) (Venice Commission 2002: Explanatory Report, para. 80).
The authority of EMBs should be recognised by key stakeholders (The Carter Center 2014: 
67). Additionally, the law should include an article requiring state authorities to respond 
to the requirements of the EA (Venice Commission 2002: Explanatory Report, para. 85).
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3. VOTER EDUCATION
Free suffrage ensures the freedom of voters to form an opinion. Voter education in this 
context should enable voters to vote by providing information on the electoral pro-
cess. Information increases not only understanding but also the confidence of voters 
in the entire electoral process and enables the electorate to make an informed choice. 
The assessment of voter education campaigns is important in understanding the different 
problems that might occur, for instance during voter registration or on election day itself.
The content of voter education, its target groups and providers are examined in sub-
section a. Sub-section b. refers to measures for groups with special needs.
a. Contents, targets and providers
Voter education should offer impartial and basic information about elections such 
as the logistics of registration, lists and the candidates standing for election (Venice 
Commission 2002: Guidelines, section I.3.1.b) or voting itself, as well as broader civic 
education. It should also raise citizens’ awareness of their democratic rights and fun-
damental freedoms (The Carter Center 2014: 96). Additionally, voter education should 
promote the principles of the rule of law and must not be discriminatory. It should 
include, in particular, information on the voting principles of universal, equal and secret 
suffrage, and information on the right to an effective remedy (ibid.: 99). Voters must be 
informed about these rights in advance, and during and after election day, whereas 
restrictions on rights have to be communicated well in advance of election day (ibid.: 98).
Voter education can consist of awareness-raising campaigns, trainings and other 
informative offers. Programmes of voter information/education can be conducted 
through state-owned or public media, as well as other means. It has become part of 
good practice that in countries with state-owned media, these channels deliver voter 
education programmes. Elections have to be scheduled in a way to allow sufficient 
time for a broad voter education programme (OHCHR 1994: 75). Education material 
has to be distributed in a timely manner.
Information must be available to all groups of society and has to be responsive to 
the needs of the entire electorate (The Carter Center 2014: 96, 98). However, it should 
in particular target groups that have been less active in previous elections and first-
time voters.
The Code of Good Practice mentions public authorities as having certain positive obli-
gations in respect of voter information (Venice Commission 2002: Guidelines, section 
I.3.1.b.). Since the EA is primarily responsible for the conduct of elections and possesses 
certain competences in this field, it should provide voter education. This is especially 
preferable in developing democracies to increase the confidence of voters in the 
impartiality of the EA and to make sure governments are financing such programmes 
(International IDEA 2006: para. 107). In case of non-permanent EAs, measures should 
be taken to preserve the institutional knowledge on elections. However, voter educa-
tion should not be offered solely by the EA. States should also permit political parties, 
candidates and CSOs to act in this field (ibid.: para. 108).
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3. VOTER EDUCATION
Free suffrage ensures the freedom of voters to form an opinion. Voter education in this 
context should enable voters to vote by providing information on the electoral pro-
cess. Information increases not only understanding but also the confidence of voters 
in the entire electoral process and enables the electorate to make an informed choice. 
The assessment of voter education campaigns is important in understanding the different 
problems that might occur, for instance during voter registration or on election day itself.
The content of voter education, its target groups and providers are examined in sub-
section a. Sub-section b. refers to measures for groups with special needs.
a. Contents, targets and providers
Voter education should offer impartial and basic information about elections such 
as the logistics of registration, lists and the candidates standing for election (Venice 
Commission 2002: Guidelines, section I.3.1.b) or voting itself, as well as broader civic 
education. It should also raise citizens’ awareness of their democratic rights and fun-
damental freedoms (The Carter Center 2014: 96). Additionally, voter education should 
promote the principles of the rule of law and must not be discriminatory. It should 
include, in particular, information on the voting principles of universal, equal and secret 
suffrage, and information on the right to an effective remedy (ibid.: 99). Voters must be 
informed about these rights in advance, and during and after election day, whereas 
restrictions on rights have to be communicated well in advance of election day (ibid.: 98).
Voter education can consist of awareness-raising campaigns, trainings and other 
informative offers. Programmes of voter information/education can be conducted 
through state-owned or public media, as well as other means. It has become part of 
good practice that in countries with state-owned media, these channels deliver voter 
education programmes. Elections have to be scheduled in a way to allow sufficient 
time for a broad voter education programme (OHCHR 1994: 75). Education material 
has to be distributed in a timely manner.
Information must be available to all groups of society and has to be responsive to 
the needs of the entire electorate (The Carter Center 2014: 96, 98). However, it should 
in particular target groups that have been less active in previous elections and first-
time voters.
The Code of Good Practice mentions public authorities as having certain positive obli-
gations in respect of voter information (Venice Commission 2002: Guidelines, section 
I.3.1.b.). Since the EA is primarily responsible for the conduct of elections and possesses 
certain competences in this field, it should provide voter education. This is especially 
preferable in developing democracies to increase the confidence of voters in the 
impartiality of the EA and to make sure governments are financing such programmes 
(International IDEA 2006: para. 107). In case of non-permanent EAs, measures should 
be taken to preserve the institutional knowledge on elections. However, voter educa-
tion should not be offered solely by the EA. States should also permit political parties, 
candidates and CSOs to act in this field (ibid.: para. 108).
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b. Measures for groups with specific needs
Steps should be taken to ensure de facto equality of men and women, for example 
through campaigns addressing women and their individual voting rights (The Carter 
Center 2014: 102). Such measures should not be considered discriminatory.
Further, programmes should promote equal treatment of people with disabilities. The 
public authorities must ensure that the information provided is available and accessible, 
to the greatest extent possible and taking due account of the principle of reasonable 
accommodation in all necessary alternative formats, bearing in mind the restriction 
of proportionality, legal regulations and realistic feasibility. Such “[p]ositive measures 
should be taken to overcome specific difficulties, such as illiteracy, language barriers, 
poverty, or impediments to freedom of movements which prevent persons entitled to 
vote from exercising their rights effectively” (UN Human Rights Committee 1981-2014: 
GC 25, para. 12). Further, locations and information should be accessible for people 
with disabilities (UN 2006: Article 9). The information provided should be easy to read 
and to understand.
In areas where there is a significant national minority, voter education programmes 
should also be conducted in the language of the minority group (OSCE/ODIHR 2003b: 97).
An example good practice that meets international standards both for national minori-
ties and rights of persons with disabilities was observed during the 2013 Presidential 
Election in Georgia.
Voter education campaigns for people with disabilities 
and national minorities (Georgia)
The EOM assessed that “[a] CEC voter information campaign with messages on different 
electoral aspects was broadcast on public and private media, including television (TV) infor-
mation spots broadcast in minority languages and sign language”.
Further, it noted that “For this election, the CEC established a special working group on ethnic 
minority issues, organized meetings with national minority representatives, and visited minority 
regions. The CEC provided grants to support civic integration and increase national minority 
participation in the election process. It also carried out trainings, awareness-raising, and voter 
education projects in co-operation with several minority NGOs in minority languages and 
areas. … In addition to the state language, the CEC provided election-related documents in 
Armenian and Azeri. The CEC webpage also provided information in the Abkhaz language. 
During the election period, the CEC operated a hotline in minority languages.”
Source: OSCE/ODIHR EOM to Georgia, Presidential Election 2013, Final Report, p. 7, 19.
www.osce.org/odihr/elections/110301?download=true
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Information campaign focusing on special needs of IDPs (Ukraine)
On 7 October (19 days before election day), the CEC in Ukraine changed the electoral law and 
adopted a simplified procedure permitting voters to change their voting address temporarily. 
This measure should enable, inter alia, IDPs to participate in the elections.
The Mission assessed that “[o]verall, and similar to the presidential election in May 2014, voter 
information and education in these elections proved to be insufficient. Voter education spots 
on national broadcast media were almost absent. In this respect, a targeted nationwide voter 
information or awareness campaign to inform and improve the understanding of hundreds of 
thousands of IDPs regarding the simplified procedure for registration could have contributed 
to an increased number of registration and participation of IDPs”.
Based on these findings, the Mission recommended that “for future elections, serious con-
sideration could be given to adopting an effective voter-information and education strategy 
and to carrying out a voter-information campaign focused, among others, on awareness-
raising for IDPs”.
Source: OSCE/ODIHR EOM to Ukraine, Early Parliamentary Elections 2014, Final Report, p. 13.
www.osce.org/odihr/elections/ukraine/132556?download=true
The conflict in eastern Ukraine since February 2014 has also raised the importance 
of voter education and awareness-raising campaigns targeting internally displaced 
persons (IDPs).
Following the principles of the European electoral heritage, the special needs of IDPs should 
be addressed by voter education. This is highlighted in the Final Report of the OSCE/ODIHR 
Election Observation Mission to the 2014 Early Parliamentary Elections in Ukraine.
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4. VOTER REGISTRATION
The principle of universal suffrage requires that the electoral process be organised 
in the most inclusive manner possible. As a general rule only registered people are 
allowed to vote, therefore effective voter registration is important to ensure the right 
to vote to as many people as possible. However, there have to be protective measures 
to avoid the abuse of the right to vote (e.g. by ineligible people or multiple voting).
Voter registration includes the eligibility of voters and restrictions to this; the registra-
tion process and the voter register; and measures for groups with special needs.
a. Voter eligibility
Legal criteria for the eligibility of voters formalise the key civil and political right – 
the right to vote and to elect government. Although recognised as an inherent human 
right, the right to vote is not an absolute right (UN Human Rights Committee 1981-2014: 
GC 25, para. 10). Virtually all instruments of international law allow for some restrictions. 
However, these restrictions cannot be arbitrary, that is there has to be a legitimate aim 
and respect for the principle of proportionality. Hence, restrictions must be objective and 
reasonable (OHCHR 1966: Article 25; UN Human Rights Committee 1981-2014: GC 25, 
para. 10). Furthermore, international law instruments agree that the circumstances 
and the degree of restrictions must be defined in the primary legislation of the state.
The Code of Good Practice provides useful guidance for restrictions:
 ► a minimum age is required (at the latest, the age of majority, and not later than 
the age of 25);
 ► nationality may be required, but it is recommended to allow foreigners to vote 
in local elections after a certain period of residence;
 ► residence (habitual) may be required; a maximum of six months of residence 
may be required (extensions are only admissible to protect national minorities);
 ► a residence requirement for nationals is only admissible for local and regional 
elections;
 ► states may permit out-of-country voters to vote;
 ► voters may be registered at their secondary residence, if they reside there 
regularly and are linked to this place (e.g. by paying taxes there).
An example for an inadmissible restriction, which according to the Court was not 
founded on objective and reasonable reasons, is comprised in its following judgment 
in the case Aziz v. Cyprus of 22 June 2004 (below).
The right to vote can also be suspended in case of mental incapacity or criminal convic-
tion (Venice Commission 2002: Guidelines, section I.1.1.d.iv). These deprivations must 
be established by law, proportionality must be preserved and the decision has to be 
taken explicitly by a court (ibid.: Explanatory Report, para. 6.d). Mental incapacity is not 
per se a reason for deprivation since people with disabilities should be able to exercise 
their right to vote on an equal basis with other citizens (UN 2006: Article 29(a)). In case 
of criminal conviction, serious offences must be the basis as disqualification for political 
crimes or treason committed a long time ago could be considered abusive (International 
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IDEA 2014a: 167). All in all, restrictions and deprivations of the right to vote should be 
exceptional to ensure broad participation in elections.
Inadmissible exceptions (the Court’s case law)
Facts: the applicant was a Cypriot national residing in the government-controlled part of Cyprus. 
He applied to the Ministry of the Interior, requesting to be registered in order to vote in the 2001 
parliamentary elections. The Ministry refused to register him on the grounds that, under the 
Cyprus Constitution, members of the Turkish-Cypriot community were excluded from the Greek-
Cypriot electoral roll. Since the applicant’s appeal to the Supreme Court was dismissed, he was 
unable to vote.
Law: the Court reiterated that states had considerable latitude to establish rules for parliamentary 
elections, but such rules had to be justified on reasonable and objective grounds. The difference in 
treatment of which the applicant complained, resulting from the fact that he was a Turkish-Cypriot, 
could not be justified on reasonable and objective grounds, particularly in light of the fact that 
Turkish Cypriots in the applicant’s situation had been prevented from voting at any parliamentary 
election in “the country of which he is a national and where he has always lived”.
Conclusion: violation of Article 14 (prohibition of discrimination) taken in conjunc-
tion with Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 (right to free elections).
Source: Aziz v. Cyprus (22 June 2004)
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-61834#{“itemid”:[“001-61834”]}
Conditions for deprivations of the right to vote in the case of convicted prisoners 
were concretised by the Court in two judgments – Hirst v. the United Kingdom (No. 2) 
of 6 October 2005 and Scoppola v. Italy (No. 3) of 22 May 2012.
Disenfranchisement of prisoners (the Court’s case law) (United Kingdom)
Facts: sentenced to life imprisonment for manslaughter, the applicant was disenfranchised dur-
ing his period of detention by domestic law, which applied to persons convicted, and serving a 
custodial sentence. In 2004, he was released from prison on licence. The applicant alleged that, 
as a convicted prisoner in detention, he was subject to a blanket ban on voting in elections.
Law: the Court held that although states possess a wide margin of appreciation to determine 
certain deprivations of the right to vote, those must serve a legitimate aim and the principle of 
proportionality must be met. While there is a wide range of admissible legitimate aims, for pro-
portionality a link to the sanction, the conduct and the circumstances of the individual case is 
necessary. This should be assessed in an express judicial decision to avoid arbitrariness. The Court 
concluded that “a blanket restriction on all convicted prisoners in prison” imposed “automatically 
to such prisoners, irrespective of the length of their sentence and irrespective of the nature or 
gravity of their offence and their individual circumstances” was a “general, automatic and indis-
criminate restriction”.
Conclusion: violation of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 (right to free elections).
Source: Hirst v. the United Kingdom (No. 2) (6 October 2005).
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-70442#{“itemid”:[“001-70442”]}
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Disenfranchisement of prisoners (the Court’s case law) (Italy)
Facts: the applicant was sentenced to life imprisonment for murder, attempted murder, ill-
treatment of members of his family and unauthorised possession of a firearm. Under Italian law, 
his life sentence entailed a lifetime ban from public office, which in turn meant the permanent 
forfeiture of his right to vote. The Court of Cassation dismissed an appeal, pointing out that prison 
sentences of between five years and life entailed permanent disenfranchisement (where the 
offence attracted a sentence of less than five years, the disenfranchisement lasted only five years).
Law: the Court Chamber of the Second Section on 18 January 2011 found that the disenfran-
chisement of the applicant was of the “general, automatic and indiscriminate nature” referred to 
in the Hirst judgment.
Conclusion: violation of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 (right to free elections).
Process: the Government of Italy requested that the case be referred to the Grand Chamber.
Law: the Court concluded that “in Italy there is no disenfranchisement in connection with minor 
offences or those which, although more serious in principle, do not attract sentences of three years’ 
imprisonment or more”. It also noted “that under Italian law it is possible for a convicted person 
who has been permanently deprived of the right to vote to recover that right. Three years after 
having finished serving his sentence, he can apply for rehabilitation … In addition, the length of 
the sentence actually served may be reduced in accordance with the early release mechanism … 
In the Court’s opinion this possibility shows that the Italian system is not excessively rigid.”
The Court found that “in the circumstances of the present case, the restrictions imposed on 
the applicant’s right to vote did not ‘thwart the free expression of the people in the choice of 
the legislature’, and maintained ‘the integrity and effectiveness of an electoral procedure aimed 
at identifying the will of the people through universal suffrage’ … The margin of appreciation 
afforded to the respondent Government in this sphere has therefore not been overstepped”.
Conclusion: no violation of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 (right to free elections).
Source: Scoppola v. Italy (No. 3) (22 May 2012).
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{“dmdocnumber”:[“908352”],”itemid”:[“001-111044”]}
b. Registration procedure and the voter register
Building a register of voters is the operational extension of the formalisation of the 
right to vote through eligibility criteria. Countries have a margin of appreciation to 
determine their own system for the registration of eligible voters. However, since the 
registration process is one of the most critical aspects of elections, it is vital that the 
key features of the process are clearly regulated within the primary legislation (Venice 
Commission 2002: Guidelines, section II.2.a).
This is referred to in the Final Report of the OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission 
to the 2014 Parliamentary Elections in Moldova (below).
Voter registers should be inclusive, accurate, up to date, permanent and transparent, and 
should respect voting principles and the privacy of data (International IDEA 2014a: 179). 
Local or central state authorities or the EA are responsible for guaranteeing this (ibid.: 180).
Referring to the building and the maintenance of voter registers, the Code of Good 
Practice states that the registers must be permanent and regularly updated (at least 
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once a year). If voters are required to register, they should be able to do so over a rela-
tively long period (Venice Commission 2002: Guidelines, section I.1.2), with a view to 
letting as many voters as possible be registered. Furthermore, eligible voters should not 
be hindered in registering (UN Human Rights Committee 1981-2014: GC 25, para. 11). 
For instance, states can implement measures to facilitate absentee registration (The 
Carter Center 2014: 87) or at least permit voters to return if they reside abroad, in order 
to register. The creation of a supplementary register for people who have become eli-
gible (or have moved) between registration and voting should be allowed. However, 
the application of supplementary lists for other reasons should be avoided. Generally, 
polling stations should not be allowed to register voters to avoid multiple registrations. 
Registration should be suspended as close as possible to the election day (International 
IDEA 2014a: 168) and should not take place at the polling station on election day (Venice 
Commission 2002: Guidelines, section I.1.2.iv).
An example of the building of a voter register can be found in the Final Report of the 
OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission to the 2013 Presidential Election in Azerbaijan.
Process of building a voter register (Azerbaijan)
Voters’ records in Azerbaijan are located in a permanent register maintained by the CEC. Prior 
to elections, election officials conduct verification of the voter list through door-to-door 
checks, after which the officials may modify the record. However, this process is unregulated, 
as it has no basis in the primary legal framework or administrative regulations.
The OSCE/ODIHR EOM recommended that the CEC “develop comprehensive instructions 
regulating all procedural and operational aspects of the process of voter list verification and 
updating, with clear assignment of responsibilities for every aspect of the process”.
Source: OSCE/ODIHR EOM to Azerbaijan, Presidential Election 2013, Final Report, p. 26.
www.osce.org/institutions/110015?download=true
New centralised electoral register (Moldova)
Moldova, in the past, ran a highly decentralised electoral register. Records were prepared 
locally by the public administration. In 2014, Moldova embarked on a reform of the register, 
aiming to set up a centralised electronic system called the State Register of Voters (SRV). 
As observed by the OSCE/ODIHR EOM, the SRV was based on the civil register, which was 
managed by the Ministry of Information Technology and Communications, while the CEC 
remained legally in charge of maintaining the SRV. Moldovan interlocutors complained about 
the ambiguity of this set-up.
The OSCE/ODIHR EOM assessed that the system was not sufficiently regulated and that the 
authorities had not released sufficient information on the operational procedures of the SRV. 
The EOM recommended that “the SRV would benefit from a more comprehensive regula-
tory framework, which, among others, needs to include clear mechanisms of data exchange 
between the SRV and relevant state registries, particularly the Civil Registry and the Population 
Registry, and to provide for the possibility of public scrutiny of the system”.
Source: OSCE/ODIHR EOM to Moldova, Parliamentary Elections 2014, Final Report, p. 8.
www.osce.org/odihr/elections/moldova/144196?download=true
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Inaccuracies in the registers occur due to unjustified entries or failure to enter eligible 
voters (Venice Commission 2002: Explanatory Report, para. 7.v). Therefore, the registers 
have to be published, so that voters can check if they are on the list and their data are 
correct. Voters who are not registered should have the right to be added to the register. 
Hence, publication must be done in a timely manner so as to allow for corrections and 
address challenges in advance of election day. This should be done in an expeditious 
administrative procedure (which should be subject to judicial control) or a judicial pro-
cedure (ibid.: Guidelines, section I.1.2.iv). This intends also to avoid voting by ineligible 
voters. The law should prescribe who is entitled to demand changes, additions and 
deletions and on which documents (International IDEA 2014a: 180).
Though no universal treaty focuses explicitly on transparency requirements for voter 
registration, they apply to the registration process as they do to all aspects of elec-
tions. Voter registers contain sensitive personal data and according to universal and 
regional treaties, states are under obligation to protect them (UN 2003: Article 10; Council 
of Europe 1985a: Article 5). In practice, laws must regulate the collection of personal 
information and everyone should have the right to understand what kind of data the 
state collects and for what purposes (UN Human Rights Committee 1981-2014: GC 16, 
para. 10). Further, the data should be used exclusively for those purposes for which 
they were collected and stored; they should be accurate and not excessive (Council of 
Europe 1985a: Article 5) – that is states should not require more data than necessary to 
identify the voter and prove his or her eligibility. States should also specify what voter 
information will be publicly listed in the voter register (International IDEA 2014a: 181).
c. Measures for groups with specific needs
The guiding principle concerning restrictions to eligibility must be to avoid discrimination. 
The Convention, in its Article 14, explicitly prohibits restrictions “on any ground such as 
sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, 
association with a national minority, property, birth or other status”. Additionally, physical 
disability, literacy and education cannot be grounds for disqualification (UN Human 
Rights Committee 1981-2014: GC 25, para. 10).
With regards to women, the UN Convention on the Political Rights of Women, in its Article 2, 
states: “Women shall be eligible for election to all publicly elected bodies, established by 
national law, on equal terms with men, without any discrimination.” The registration of 
women can be hindered for social, cultural, religious or legal reasons. Childcare duties, 
for instance, can prevent women from reaching registration facilities, and name changes 
due to marriage can also impede their registration (OSCE/ODIHR 2004: 25). States could 
implement special measures guaranteeing women the right and the opportunity to 
participate in elections and be registered, which should not be considered discriminatory.
Where national minorities reside, registration forms and instructions should be avail-
able in their languages (OSCE 1999: Recommendation No. 7). On the other hand, 
voters must not find themselves obliged to reveal that they belong to a national minor-
ity (Venice Commission 2002: Guidelines, section I.2.4.c).
Facilities and material for registration should be appropriate and accessible for peo-
ple with disabilities (UN 2006: Article 29(a)(i)). Assistive technologies may be used, 
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for example, to enable those with disabilities to enter and check their data in the 
voter register.
With regards to IDPs, there is a growing body of jurisprudence that advises that the 
right to vote, including voter registration, is granted to them. The UN Guiding Principles 
on Internal Displacement expressly affirm that IDPs “shall not be discriminated against 
in the enjoyment of any rights and freedoms on the ground that they are internally 
displaced” (OHCHR 2004: Principle 1.1). The Code of Good Practice recommends that 
IDPs should have the option to claim their original residence as their official residence. 
However, their right to vote is often denied because they lack identification papers or 
do not have residence registration in the area of their resettlement.
The same problems can occur with regard to Roma people. The UN Human Rights 
Committee, on the registration of Roma people in Albania, recommended the state ensure 
the issuing of identity cards to Roma people explicitly referencing their right to vote.6 
Observation reports should strive to detect the reasons for any denials of the right to vote.
As for military personnel, the Code of Good Practice advises that they should be able to 
vote at their place of residence whenever possible (Venice Commission 2002: Guidelines, 
section I.3.2.xi). Otherwise, it is advisable to register them at the polling station nearest to 
their duty station.
6. UNHRC/C/ALB/CO/2 (Albania 2013), para. 23. Available here: www.refworld.org/pdfid/5283461e4.pdf
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5. CANDIDATE REGISTRATION
Candidates, political parties and coalitions represent the opinions of the voters and 
their political attitudes. The precondition for their participation in an election campaign 
is their registration. To ensure a representative choice in a democracy, the greatest 
possible percentage of the electorate must be able to stand for elections while at the 
same time taking into consideration the existing restrictions.
The following chapter deals with the right to stand for elections and restrictions to it; 
the registration procedure; and candidates belonging to underrepresented groups 
with specific needs.
a. The right to stand for elections
According to the principle of universal suffrage, each citizen has the right to stand for elec-
tions. However, since this is not an absolute right, limitations can apply. These restrictions 
should be based on objective and reasonable criteria that are established by law (UN Human 
Rights Committee 1981-2014: GC 25, para. 4). Any restriction should not unduly hinder 
people in standing for elections, to prevent the domination of an unrepresentative elite in 
elected bodies (Council of Europe 1985b). However, restrictions can be stricter than in the 
case of voter eligibility and may be divided into “reasonable” and “unreasonable” restrictions. 
There may also be deprivations of the right to stand for elections.
The Venice Commission (2002: Guidelines, section I.1.1) provides a list of basic “reason-
able restrictions” concerning:
 – age: the required minimum age should be preferably the same as that for the 
right to vote; the age limit may be stricter but should not exceed 25 years of 
age, except for certain offices (e.g. presidents or mayors), to avoid discrimination 
against young adults;
 – nationality: the right to stand in local elections may be awarded to foreigners 
(legally and habitually) residing in a country for five years (Council of Europe 1997: 
Article 6(1)); citizens residing abroad may be accorded the right to stand for elections;
 – residency (habitual): for nationals, the length of residence may only be required 
for local or regional elections and should not exceed six months.
Examples of such restrictions are provided in the Final Report of the OSCE/ODIHR 
Election Observation Mission to the 2013 Presidential Election in Georgia.
Basic restrictions to the right to stand for elections (Georgia)
The EOM found that “[u]nder the Constitution, any citizen of Georgia who has the right to vote, 
is at least 35 years of age, has lived in Georgia for at least five years, and resided in Georgia for 
at least three years before the election was called, may be elected president. The residency 
requirements imposed appear disproportionate and at odds with international standards.”
It therefore recommended: “The existing residency requirements for presidential candidates 
appear overly restrictive and should be reconsidered or reduced.”
Source: OSCE/ODIHR EOM to Georgia, Presidential Election 2013, Final Report, p. 8.
www.osce.org/odihr/elections/110301?download=true
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Another reasonable restriction to eligibility may be limiting the number of terms in 
office (European Charter of Local Self-Government: para. 67). Further, there can be 
certain incompatibilities that can affect a candidate’s status since some public offices 
include the duty to be impartial (e.g. for judges, prosecutors, police officers, members 
of election commissions, tax authorities or members of the defence forces). Applicants 
holding such offices may be asked to resign from their positions before campaigning 
to avoid a conflict of interests (ibid.: paras. 55-66).
“Unreasonable restrictions” can be, for example, based on political or other opinion, 
party membership, illiteracy, education, property requirements (UN Human Rights 
Committee 1981-2014: GC 25, para. 10), economic circumstances (OHCHR 1994: 65) 
or the holding of another position that does not constitute a conflict of interest (UN 
Human Rights Committee 1981-2014: GC 25, para. 16).
The right to be elected can also be suspended. The conditions for such restrictions 
must be provided for by law and the principle of proportionality has to be observed 
according to the Code of Good Practice. Any withdrawal of political rights must be 
based on mental incapacity or criminal conviction for a serious offence, and may only 
be imposed by the express decision of a court. However, conditions for depriving indi-
viduals of the right to stand for election may be less strict than for disenfranchising 
them (Venice Commission 2002: Explanatory Report, para. 6.d).
b. Registration procedure and the candidate list
Candidate registration, that is receiving and validating nominations, is one of the core 
tasks of the EA, the duty of which is to treat all candidates impartially and equitably 
(International IDEA 2006: 74, 151).
Candidates can be political parties, coalitions of parties or individuals, or independent 
candidates. Political parties may be able to participate in an election campaign auto-
matically because of their status as registered parties. In this event, party formation 
requirements become interesting for election observers (ibid.: 192). All requirements 
must not be so strict as to impair the freedom of association. Additionally, all par-
ties should be treated equally by the state, regardless of their ideological position 
(International IDEA 2014a: 192), and be able to nominate candidates in their favour. In 
any case, registration must not be abused to suppress inconvenient movements, and 
the law must not be applied arbitrarily or discriminatorily (The Carter Center 2014: 109, 
111). Individuals may run as independent or non-affiliated candidates. The requirements 
for political parties and independent candidates should be the same in order to avoid 
disadvantages for the latter (UN Human Rights Committee 1981-2014: GC 25, para. 17). 
States may even ease registration for independent candidates. If registered, no one 
should suffer a disadvantage from the sole fact of his or her candidacy (ibid.: para. 15).
The registration process needs to be clearly regulated by rules, set in advance of the 
opening of the registration, and stating how and where the registration takes place 
and how the registration is verified. The process should be inclusive and transparent. 
Candidates must have adequate time to register and should be given sufficient infor-
mation on registration periods (International IDEA 2014a: 192).
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To register and to prove the seriousness of the candidature and sufficient support by 
voters, additional requirements such as monetary deposits or minimum number of 
signatures (with or without a geographical spread) can be applied (ibid.: 193). Another 
means is to require a financial deposit, which must be refunded if the party or candi-
date exceeds a certain score (Venice Commission 2002: Guidelines, section I. 1.3.vi).
In its case Sukhovetskyy v. Ukraine (28 March 2006) the Court addresses the conditions 
and limits of financial deposits.
The candidate can also be asked to collect a minimum number of supporting signa-
tures. However, their number should not exceed 1% of the voters in the constituency 
(Venice Commission 2002: Guidelines, section I.1.3.ii) and voters should be able to sign 
for more than one party or candidate (The Carter Center 2014: 113). The procedure 
of validating signatures is particularly sensitive. In general, all signatures should be 
checked. If the required number of valid signatures is reached, the rest do not need to 
be considered (International IDEA 2014a: 193). An administrative or judicial body can 
execute the validation procedure, which must be terminated by the beginning of the 
electoral campaign period to grant all candidates the same chances. The whole pro-
cess should be open to scrutiny by party or candidate agents and election observers.
Denial of a registration must be based on objective criteria. The reasons for withdrawal 
or removal in a particular case should be made public immediately. Minor errors should 
be allowed to be corrected before a nomination is rejected.
This is noted in the Final Report of the OSCE/ODIHR Elections Observation Mission to 
the 2012 Parliamentary Elections in Ukraine.
Deposit requirements (the Court’s case law)
Facts: the applicant wanted to stand for the parliamentary elections of January 2002. However, 
a local electoral commission refused to register him as a candidate due to his failure to pay an 
electoral deposit equivalent to about €160 at the time. The applicant claimed he was unable to 
meet the requirement since his annual income amounted to the equivalent of about €140. The 
CEC upheld the refusal and his complaint to the Supreme Court was likewise refused.
Law: the Court noted that the electoral laws of a number of European states provided for measures 
to discourage frivolous candidates from standing. Moreover, the states participated in the cam-
paign costs of the registered candidates to promote equality among the contestants. Hence, the 
Court concluded that the law in question “pursued the legitimate aim of guaranteeing the right 
to effective, streamlined representation by … confining elections to serious candidates, whilst 
avoiding the unreasonable outlay of public funds”. Moreover, the Court recognised the “careful 
consideration by the domestic legislature and judiciary” on the amount of the deposit in Ukraine, 
which was among the lowest in Europe. The deposit could not therefore “be considered to have 
been excessive or such as to constitute an insurmountable administrative or financial barrier” for 
standing in the elections.
Conclusion: no violation of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 (right to free elections).
Source: Sukhovetskyy v. Ukraine (28 March 2006).
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-72893#{“itemid”:[“001-72893”]}
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An effective remedy to an independent judicial body should be provided in case of 
refusal of a registration (OHCHR 1994: para. 107). Complaints must be heard within an 
expedited timeframe to allow corrections or the registration of the applicant before elec-
tion day if his or her appeal is successful (International IDEA 2014a: 193). There should 
be a clearly set deadline after which candidatures cannot be challenged any more.
According to the principle of free suffrage, states have an obligation to provide informa-
tion to the public on lists and candidates (Venice Commission 2002: Guidelines, section 
I.3.1.b). Candidate lists should be published at the end of the registration process and 
posted in polling stations on election day.
c. Candidates belonging to underrepresented groups
The right to stand for elections should be granted without any discrimination 
(OSCE 1990a: para. 7.5). States can implement special measures that increase partici-
pation of traditionally underrepresented groups.
The right to be eligible for all public offices is guaranteed to women as any discrimina-
tion on grounds of sex is prohibited under Article 14 of the Convention. In the Court’s 
case law, this prohibition is interpreted in the case Staatkundig Gereformeerde Partij 
v. the Netherlands (10 July 2012) (below).
The Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, in its Recommendation Rec(2003)3, 
recognises that women’s equal participation “in political and public decision mak-
ing is a matter of the full enjoyment of human rights … and a necessary condition 
for the better functioning of a democratic society”. The Parliamentary Assembly’s 
Recommendation 1899 (2010) suggests that for a more equitable and balanced rep-
resentation of women, special measures, such as quotas, may be introduced. Other 
measures noted here include candidate lists alternating men and women and putting 
women at the top of the list, or in a majoritarian system the obligation to ensure equal 
participation of women and men among candidates of the same party (see also Venice 
Commission 2006a).
Rejecting registration due to minor mistakes (Ukraine)
The EOM noted that “[t]he CEC considered any nomination document that did not contain 
all data required by law as not having been filed and rejected candidates for the omission 
of these documents. Despite its authority to ensure citizens’ electoral rights, the CEC did not 
inform candidates about mistakes and omissions, leaving them unable to correct mistakes. 
Overall, 441 nominees were not registered, mostly on the grounds that necessary docu-
ments had not been provided; many were rejected for minor omissions, which is at odds 
with paragraph 24 of the 1990 OSCE Copenhagen Document”.
It therefore recommended: “Effective notification mechanisms could be introduced so that 
prospective candidates are informed by the election administration of cases where mistakes or 
omissions were found in their nomination documents, enabling them to correct such mistakes.”
Source: OSCE/ODIHR EOM to Ukraine, Parliamentary Elections 2012, Final Report, p. 14.
www.osce.org/odihr/elections/98578?download=true
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In its Final Report, the OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission to the 2012 
Parliamentary Elections in Ukraine recommended the introduction of measures to 
increase women’s participation.
At the same time, mechanisms should exist that, for example, deny the registration of 
candidate lists that are not composed in a balanced way, or impose financial penalties, 
to encourage parties to introduce equitable measures. This is emphasised in the find-
ings of the OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission to the 2014 Early Parliamentary 
Elections in Ukraine.
Further, the way in which women are portrayed in general and during the election 
campaign has an impact on the desire of women to stand as candidates and their 
likelihood of being elected. States may hence implement training and mentoring pro-
grammes to encourage women to stand as candidates (The Carter Center 2014: 114).
Eligibility of women (the Court’s case law)
Facts: the applicant is a Dutch association, functioning as a political party called the Reformed 
Protestant Party. This is a confessional political party basing itself directly on the “infallible Word of 
God as revealed in the Bible” and professing its absolute authority over all areas of societal life. The 
party believes that, although all human beings are of equal value as God’s creatures, differences 
in nature, talents, place and role in society should be recognised. Thus, women are not inferior to 
men as human beings; however, they should not be eligible for public office. In a 2010 judgment 
the Dutch Supreme Court upheld that the state was under obligation to take measures to ensure 
that the party grants the right to stand for election to women. Following this judgment, the party 
lodged an application to the Court alleging violations of Article 9 (freedom of religion), Article 10 
(freedom of expression) and Article 11 (freedom of assembly and association).
Decision on admissibility: although the Court ruled that the case was inadmissible, it took the 
view that the action to bar women would result in denying their fundamental human rights under 
Article 3 of Protocol 1 (right to free elections) and Article 14 (prohibition of discrimination) of the 
Convention, regardless of the deeply held religious convictions on which such actions were based.
Source: Staatkundig Gereformeerde Partij v. the Netherlands (10 July 2012).
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-112340#{“itemid”:[“001-112340”]}
Measures to increase women’s participation in decision making (Ukraine)
The OSCE/ODIHR EOM noted that despite gender equality being included in the Ukrainian 
Constitution there was a lack of interest among parties to promote female candidates and that 
few women were included in top positions or other eligible positions on parties’ candidate lists.
Based on this, the EOM recommended: “Political parties could be encouraged to promote 
gender equality and to take resolute actions to put forward gender-balanced candidate lists, 
to increase visibility of female candidates during election campaigns and to integrate gender 
issues into their platforms. The introduction of a gender requirement for nomination of party 
lists could be considered as a temporary measure.”
Source: OSCE/ODIHR EOM to Ukraine, Parliamentary Election 2012, Final Report, p. 37.
www.osce.org/odihr/98578?download=true
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In addition, candidates with children may be discouraged to stand as candidates as 
they must reconcile their jobs and childcare with the duties of their public positions 
if they are elected (Congress of Local and Regional Authorities 2015a: para. 5). Often 
they also face the possibility of lower wages and even job loss because of their public 
duties. This can lead to an overrepresentation of rich and elderly people with fewer 
such limitations (ibid.: para. 2). Therefore, states should consider measures to increase 
the attractiveness of public offices.
People with disabilities should be able to participate in political and public life as elected 
representatives on an equal basis with other citizens at all levels of government (Council 
of Europe 1950: Article 14; UN 2006: Article 29) This includes the right to independently 
stand as candidates in elections. If appropriate, auxiliary and new technologies should 
be used to enable people with disabilities to run for office.
National minorities should be granted the right to stand for elections without discrimi-
nation (Council of Europe 1995: Article 4; OSCE 1999: Recommendation 7). According 
to the Code of Good Practice, information on lists and candidates must be available in 
minority languages, at least where they amount to a certain percentage of the popu-
lation. For candidates from national minorities, specific list positions may be reserved 
to ensure their equal participation.
IDPs must be granted the right to stand for elections on an equal basis with all other 
citizens (OHCHR 2004: Principle 1.1) by putting into place special measures aimed at 
ensuring their access to candidate registration.
Enforcement mechanisms for gender equality (Ukraine)
The OSCE/ODIHR EOM noted that “[a]mendments to the Law on Political Parties adopted 
in 2013 introduced a 30 per cent quota for women on party lists, but the law remains silent on 
the ranking of candidates on party lists, and there are no enforcement mechanisms in place”.
Based on this, the EOM recommended: “Notwithstanding possible changes to the electoral 
system, women’s underrepresentation in parliament should be addressed through stricter 
enforcement mechanisms and/or additional special temporary measures that could create 
more equitable conditions for all candidates.”
Source: OSCE/ODIHR EOM to Ukraine, Early Parliamentary Elections 2014, Final Report, p. 32.
www.osce.org/odihr/elections/ukraine/132556?download=true
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6. ELECTION CAMPAIGN
The election campaign is the primary, central factor in the formation of the voters’ 
opinion. Hence, voters must not be coerced or intimidated. Additionally, while contest-
ing for the favour of the voters, candidates and political parties must be guaranteed in 
particular a level playing field and the freedom of opinion and expression.
The two major issues of the election campaign are highlighted below.
a. Campaign conduct
During the election campaign all political forces and candidates should be free to engage 
in political campaigning and to distribute their programmes freely and equally to the 
electorate (OHCHR 1966: Articles 25-6; International IDEA 2014a: 214). This assumes 
an equal timeframe for campaigning and the state fulfilling its obligations to treat the 
candidates equally, taking into account underrepresented groups’ special needs and 
the granting of fundamental freedoms, not to mention the candidates’ commitment 
to fair behaviour.
The timeframe
The length of the campaign period should be equal for all candidates and adequate 
to enable them to campaign effectively; a concrete starting point may be codified 
(International IDEA 2014a: 214; OHCHR 1994: para. 108). At the end of the campaign, 
a campaign silence period may be imposed – though not overly long – to allow 
voters to decide on their vote freely and without pressure (Committee of Ministers 1999: 
Appendix, para. III.1).
Equal treatment of candidates by state authorities
State authorities are obliged to act impartially and treat political parties and candidates 
equally with regard to public funding, broadcasting times and other campaign-related 
aspects (Venice Commission 2002: Guidelines, section I.2.3.a). The equal level of com-
petitors should be codified to the point of clear conditions for the placement of the 
candidates on the ballot paper (The Carter Center 2014: 115). The legal framework must 
be applied uniformly to all candidates (Venice Commission 2002: Explanatory Report, 
para. 18). Public employees who are not directly involved in the EA should not interfere 
with the election campaign (OSCE/ODIHR 2003b: 82).
The impartiality of state authorities is elaborated in the Final Report of the OSCE/ODIHR 
Election Observation Mission to the 2013 Presidential Election in Azerbaijan.
Fundamental freedoms
Of particular relevance during the election campaign are fundamental human rights – 
notably the freedoms of association, of opinion and expression, of assembly as well as of 
movement. However, these rights may be restricted as long as they are proportional, in 
the public interest and based on law (Venice Commission 2002: Guidelines, section II.1.b).
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Firstly, people need to have the right to freely associate for political purposes, which 
comprises the formation and joining of political parties or non-governmental organisa-
tions (NGOs), such as groups of election observers (Council of Europe 1950: Article 11; 
OHCHR 1966: Article 22; UN Human Rights Committee 1981-2014: GC 25, para. 27).
Central for candidates is the freedom of opinion and expression (Article 10 of the 
Convention) allowing them to freely express their political points of view. It would be 
too restrictive to request candidates to submit their campaign material to the EA before 
it is published (Venice Commission 2002: Explanatory Report, para. 61). A candidate’s 
opinion opposing the government or calling for constitutional change should be 
admissible since this represents the essence of democratic debate. Electoral law that 
prohibits insulting or defamatory references to officials or other contestants violates 
European standards (ibid.). Further, voters, candidates and political parties should not 
be subject to pressure, intimidation or manipulation. Ultimately, voters must be able 
to receive basic information on all contestants.
The state must ensure the freedom of assembly (Article 11 of the Convention), which for 
voters and all political forces comprises the freedom to assemble peacefully in public 
places, and to hold meetings or campaign events. Restrictions may apply according 
to Article 11(2) of the Convention if they are in “law and are necessary in a democratic 
society in the interests of national security or public safety, for the prevention of dis-
order or crime, for the protection of health or morals or for the protection of the rights 
and freedoms of others”.
Inadmissible restrictions were noted in the OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission’s 
Final Report on the 2012 Parliamentary Elections in Belarus.
Freedom of movement (Article 2(1) of Protocol No. 4 to the Convention) entails in par-
ticular that the movement of campaign workers and materials should not be restricted 
or interfered with (The Carter Center 2014: 119).
The state should, finally, ensure the security of candidates, campaign workers and sup-
porters according to Article 5(1) of the Convention. Security forces can be deployed 
moderately and adequately for this task assuming that they act impartially and 
Impartiality of state authorities in the election campaign (Azerbaijan)
The EOM observed that “[s]ome contestants experienced difficulties in renting private prem-
ises for their activities due to alleged pressure by the local authorities. The campaign of a 
candidate alleged obstruction of their campaign activities by the police”.
It concluded: “Authorities should undertake further measures to ensure that election cam-
paigning be conducted in an atmosphere free from intimidation and fear of retribution. 
Authorities … should refrain from coercing public-sector employees, campaign activists and 
others to attend campaign events of incumbents, as well as disrupting campaign events of 
the opposition.”
Source: OSCE/ODIHR EOM to Azerbaijan, Presidential Election 2013, Final Report, p. 12.
www.osce.org/institutions/110015?download=true
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without intimidating stakeholders and citizens (European Commission 2008: 75; OSCE/
ODIHR 2003b: 79).
These freedoms and any restrictions on them must be clearly regulated by law and 
any violation by candidates or authorities should be subject to appropriate sanctions 
(Venice Commission 2002: Explanatory Report, para. 19).
Principles of good behaviour for candidates
States should define in their electoral or criminal law types of campaign conduct and 
behaviour that are prohibited such as vote buying (provision of money or other bene-
fits to citizens in the hope of their vote), violence and intimidation while campaigning, 
or advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred (OHCHR 1966: Article 20(2); OSCE/
ODIHR 2015: 23). These rules must be clear and unambiguous to enable candidates to 
understand which behaviour is inoffensive (International IDEA 2014a: 216). Reasonable 
sanctions should apply equally to all offenders taking into account the weight of the 
offence; disqualifications of candidates may be admissible for a limited period of time 
(ibid.). Candidates must not be held liable for offences committed by their supporters 
(Venice Commission 2002: Explanatory Report, para. 61). The legal framework must also 
provide procedures for complaints and appeals during campaigns. An effective remedy 
requires prompt decisions to avoid irreparable harm (International IDEA 2014a: 215).
In particular, the misuse of administrative resources for partisan purposes by governing 
parties and their candidates, such as the use of government offices and equipment 
(e.g. means of telecommunication) or official vehicles should be prohibited (Venice 
Commission/OSCE/ODIHR 2016: section II.B.1.1; OSCE/ODIHR 2003b: 82). Additionally, 
if programmes are introduced by the government shortly before elections, such as 
public works or patronages, it should be carefully observed whether in fact particu-
lar candidates or parties benefit from the promotion of those programmes (OSCE/
ODIHR 2003b: 82). In general, the advantage of incumbency that applies to contest-
ants (or representatives of the parties) holding official positions and performing official 
duties during the campaign can potentially lead to a blurred line between the state 
and political parties (OSCE 1990a: para. 5.4).
The right to assemble in the election campaign (Belarus)
The EOM noted “the presence of police officers in civilian clothing at campaign events organ-
ized by opposition candidates, where participants were sometimes filmed or photographed 
by unidentified individuals who did not represent the media. These and other incidents 
contributed to an atmosphere of intimidation and pressure on candidates and activists asso-
ciated with the opposition”.
Accordingly it stressed that “[a]ll electoral stakeholders should be able to exercise their right 
to assemble during elections … without the threat of arrest”.
Source: OSCE/ODIHR EOM to Belarus, Parliamentary Elections 2012, Final Report, p. 11.
www.osce.org/odihr/elections/98146?download=true
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Moreover, the manipulation or intimidation of government employees, such as order-
ing them to attend election campaign rallies or requiring them to make payments to 
political parties should be prohibited by law (The Carter Center 2014: 127).
An example of undue encouragement of public employees in election campaigning 
can be found in the Final Report of the OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission to 
the 2012 Parliamentary Elections in Armenia.
Candidates and political parties may also agree on voluntary codes of conduct com-
prising commitments to respect other contestants and the rights of citizens as well 
as good practices, such as not destroying the posters or leaflets of rival contestants 
or not preventing them from holding meetings or demonstrations (International 
IDEA 2014a: 215).
Measures for underrepresented groups
Special measures can apply for traditionally underrepresented groups to avoid 
discrimination in terms of Article 14 of the Convention and their exclusion from the 
election campaign.
States can consider measures for female candidates such as leadership and negotia-
tion training, mentoring programmes or additional public funding to increase their 
visibility in the election campaign (The Carter Center 2014: 114). On the other hand, 
candidates and parties could consider how to better integrate gender issues in their 
campaigning to attract more female voters.
This is noted in the Final Report of the OSCE/ODIHR EOM to the 2013 Presidential 
Election in Georgia.
Public places and facilities should be accessible for the campaigning of candidates with 
disabilities through auxiliary means and new technologies where necessary (UN 2006: 
Articles 9, 29(a)).
Furthermore, candidates belonging to national minorities must be free to express 
their views along with other candidates. National minority issues could be addressed 
Undue encouragement of public employees in election campaigns (Armenia)
In Armenia, the EOM “observed numerous cases where RPA [Republican Party of Armenia] 
actively involved teachers and pupils in campaign events, including in schools and/or during 
school hours. The RPA campaign was conducted at the local level with the active participation 
of school directors and teachers. In one instance, the rector of a private university, during 
school hours, encouraged attendants to vote for RPA candidates.” Consequently, it held that 
“[t]he misuse of administrative resources, including human resources of education-sector 
employees… contributed to an unequal playing field for political contestants, contravening 
paragraph 7.7 of the OSCE 1990 Copenhagen Document.”
Source: OSCE/ODIHR EOM to Armenia, Parliamentary Elections 2012, Final Report, p. 12.
www.osce.org/odihr/elections/91643?download=true
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by other candidates and parties by including national minorities, especially if there is 
no minority candidate standing.
b. Campaign financing
Firstly, it should be noted that it is necessary in the field of campaign financing to 
exercise care and be aware of differences in national campaign finance systems. The 
following standards are hence best interpreted as principles or objectives of regula-
tion rather than blueprints.
Campaign financing comprises direct or indirect expenditure and contributions for 
electoral purposes (OSCE/ODIHR 2015: 18). Indirect funding or in-kind contributions 
include, for instance, the provision of public or private space or facilities (e.g. postal 
services, airtime), direct payment for election campaign goods and services by its pro-
viders or their supply at less than market price, or loans on favourable terms.
Aspects of campaign financing that will be considered in the following sections are the 
legal framework, rules for private and public support, limits on campaign expenditure 
as well as disclosure and monitoring of campaign finances.
The legal framework
The law should comprise rules for both political party and campaign financing, and 
not only for parties but also for individual candidates and elected representatives 
(International IDEA 2014a: 91). It is particularly important that the regulation of the 
non-election financing of political parties is co-ordinated with the regulation of cam-
paign financing, so that the latter cannot be disguised as “ordinary” finance. The legal 
framework should clearly state the timeframe in which campaign finance rules apply 
and must be clear, unambiguous and publicly available (OSCE/ODIHR 2015: 18; The 
Carter Center 2014: 109). The regulations should promote transparency as well as aim 
at the integrity of the entire electoral process and grant a level playing field for all con-
testants (International IDEA 2014a: 91). “Effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanc-
tions” (Committee of Ministers 2003b: Article 16) should be defined for the violation 
of the law by political parties and candidates and for corruption (UN 2003: Articles 24, 
26; OHCHR 1994: para. 118). Sanctions should eliminate any benefit gained from the 
violation and may range from administrative sanctions, depending on the seriousness 
The image of women in the election campaign (Georgia)
The EOM noted that “in their campaigns and platforms candidates did not bring up issues 
specifically affecting women and most of them referred to the traditional role of women in 
the Georgian family.”
It therefore suggested: “Parties and candidates could consider how to integrate a gender 
perspective into their campaign strategies in order to better represent the interests of both 
male and female voters.”
Source: OSCE/ODIHR EOM to Georgia, Presidential Election 2013, Final Report, p. 10.
www.osce.org/odihr/elections/110301?download=true
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of violations (e.g. the monetary impact), to criminal sanctions in case of significant 
violations (OSCE/ODIHR 2015: 22).
Private funding
Parties and candidates should be entitled to receive resources from individuals and 
legal entities for electoral purposes and may be allowed to contribute to their own 
campaign within reasonable limits (Committee of Ministers 2003b: Article 1; Venice 
Commission 2006b: para. 31). Regulations should encourage parties to formulate their 
financing mechanisms with the aim of achieving autonomy. Adequate restrictions on 
private funding of candidates and political parties as well as associated entities should 
be considered to create a level playing field, enhance independence and transparency, 
and prevent corruption (Committee of Ministers 2003b: Articles 3(a), 3(b), 6; UN Human 
Rights Committee 1981-2014: GC 25, para. 19). Limits can refer to maximum values 
and sources of loans if they are permitted, the sum of donations in total, or the value 
of donations provided by a single donor (The Carter Center 2014: 123). Particularly, 
contributions made by anonymous donors should be restricted to a certain limit to 
ensure that they cannot unduly influence the election campaign removed from public 
scrutiny (Congress of Local and Regional Authorities 2000: para. 16). Moreover, dona-
tions from foreign donors and companies providing goods or services to the state 
should be limited or strictly regulated (Committee of Ministers 2003b: Articles 5(b), 7).
Public funding
Political parties should obtain reasonable support from the state for electoral purposes, 
in order to help political parties become independent of single private donors and their 
interests (Parliamentary Assembly 2001: para. 8(a)(ii)). However, states themselves should 
not interfere with the independence of political parties (Committee of Ministers 2003b: 
Article 1). State support may also be used to promote parliamentary stability or to pur-
sue other aims. For example, subsidies may be provided to match private donations 
up to a certain point, and on condition that the party or candidate fulfils disclosure 
requirements – thereby encouraging political participation and transparency. Public 
funding must be allocated in a timely manner for candidates to run their campaign, 
and equitably, that is either strictly or proportionally equal (Venice Commission 2002: 
Guidelines, section I.2.3.b; European Commission 2008: 75). The latter means that par-
ties receive funding according to the votes they gained in previous elections or to their 
seats in parliament. In addition, state support should ideally be extended to parties 
standing for election and enjoying a minimum level of civic encouragement in order to 
enable new parties to compete with established ones (Parliamentary Assembly 2001: 
para. 8(a)(ii); OSCE 1990a: para. 7.6).
Limits on campaign expenditure
Expenditure ceilings or a total ban on certain types of spending (e.g. private TV adver-
tising) could be considered to grant equality of opportunity (Venice Commission 2002: 
Explanatory Report, para. 21). If so, the term “expenditure” should be clearly defined by 
law, in-kind expenses should be calculated according to their market value and imposed 
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limits should be balanced against the fundamental freedoms of parties and candidates 
and their need to run an effective campaign (OSCE/ODIHR 2015: 35).
Disclosure and monitoring of campaign finances
To enhance transparency and accountability, the contestants should publish com-
prehensible reports on their campaign finances in advance and after election day 
(ibid.: 20). Such reports should include information on all entities that are directly or 
indirectly related to, or otherwise under the control of, a political party (Committee 
of Ministers 2003b: Article 11). Additional to the nature and value of each donation 
(financial and in-kind), the source of a donation that exceeds a certain value should be 
disclosed while simultaneously recognising the need to keep a balance between trans-
parency and the privacy of donors (ibid.: Articles 12(a), (b); The Carter Center 2014: 127).
Moreover, candidates and political parties should be required to present data on elec-
tion campaign financing – and where applicable at least on an annual basis on party 
financing – to an independent, public oversight authority in order to monitor the 
implementation of regulations (Committee of Ministers 2003b: Article 13(a); OSCE/
ODIHR 2015: 20). The decisions of such bodies should be accessible, provided in a 
timely manner and open to appeal by parties and candidates (The Carter Center 2014: 
128). Of particular importance with regard to the independence of public monitoring 
bodies are appointment procedures, a clear definition of the bodies’ powers and a 
sufficient budget.
These aspects were stressed by the OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission in its 
Final Report on the 2014 Parliamentary Elections in Moldova.
Campaign finance monitoring (Moldova)
In Moldova, the CEC receives reports by contestants who have opened a dedicated bank 
account for campaign expenditure (this is not prescribed by law, but is done by most contest-
ants). The CEC can issue warnings if reports are not submitted within the deadlines or not 
in the required format, and take decisions. However, if complaints are submitted, the CEC 
often does not have the means to verify the evidence. In such cases, the CEC forwards the 
complaints to the General Prosecutor’s Office and to the tax and police authorities where 
some cases remain unaddressed or unpunished.
The EOM concluded: “Consideration could be given to designating an independent body 
with means and resources to oversee campaign finance and to impose sanctions in cases 
of violations. Should this body remain to be the CEC, it should be vested with full oversight 
authority and responsibilities and should exercise them more determinedly.”
Source: OSCE/ODIHR EOM to Moldova, Parliamentary Elections 2014, Final Report, pp. 12-14.
www.osce.org/odihr/elections/moldova/144196?download=true
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7. MEDIA COVERAGE OF THE ELECTIONS
The media play an essential role in democratic societies since they contribute fundamen-
tally to the formation of public opinion and help to control the distribution of power, 
thus strengthening democracies. During elections, media inform the public about the 
electoral process, analyse the campaign, provide platforms for electoral stakeholders 
and exert a controlling role. Therefore, the media play a key role to enable voters to 
make an informed choice. This requires fair, impartial and comprehensive media cover-
age of elections in the form of timely, accurate and unbiased reports.
The following sections deal with the underlying conditions of the media’s freedom 
in elections, the required fair and impartial media coverage, and underrepresented 
groups and their specific needs.
a. Freedom of the media in elections
The precondition for pluralistic and fair information on elections is the media’s ability 
to work in a free and unhindered manner. In particular, this comprises the state’s guar-
antee of freedom of expression and other fundamental rights to the media as well as a 
neutral attitude on the part of state authorities towards media coverage of elections, 
especially by publicly owned media (Venice Commission 2002: Guidelines, sections 
I.2.3.a.ii, II.1.a; Committee of Ministers 2007a: para I.1, II.1).
Freedom of expression in elections and related rights
The freedom of expression enshrined in Article 10 of the Convention is one of the 
fundamental freedoms essential to any democratic society and must be granted to 
the media – including online media – and its representatives. This entails free, non-
discriminatory and broad access to information about the electoral process and the 
ability to report from confidential sources without any interference by state authori-
ties, which should not ask journalists to register or to possess a licence (UN Human 
Rights Committee 1981-2014: GC 34, paras. 43-5). Voters must be guaranteed the right 
to receive media output (ibid.: para. 13). The media and citizens should be given the 
right to an effective and timely remedy if their rights are infringed upon (International 
IDEA 2014a: 202).
However, freedom of expression can be limited, according to Article 10(2) of the 
Convention, assuming that restrictions:
are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national 
security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the 
protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for 
preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the 
authority and impartiality of the judiciary.
Consequently, the media are also obliged to respect the rights of others. In some coun-
tries, this means a prohibition on releasing opinion polls for a limited period, until polling 
is completed or during the campaign silence period (Committee of Ministers 2007a: 
para. I.7). This can only be justified in order to allow voters to form their opinion without 
pressure or undue influence (International IDEA 2014a: 230).
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Additionally, media coverage of elections evoking national, racial or religious hatred 
should be prohibited in line with Article 20(1) of the ICCPR and appropriate sanctions 
should apply in case of violations. On the other hand, in a pluralistic society there is 
a certain degree of tolerance with regard to provocative speech especially affecting 
government authorities, elected officials and contestants (Venice Commission 2002: 
Explanatory Report, para. 61). Even if offensive, shocking or disturbing, it should not be 
inhibited or sanctioned. In particular, claims of defamation should not be abused to sup-
press criticism of the government or its institutions (UN Human Rights Committee 1981-
2014: GC 34, paras. 38, 42, 47).
The limits of freedom of expression with regard to defamation and insult are con-
cretised by the Court in its judgment on the case Lopes Gomes da Silva v. Portugal 
of 28 December 2000.
Should these limits be exceeded in individual cases, the sanctions for defamation must 
be proportionate, applying only to the most serious cases, and imprisonment is never 
appropriate (UN Human Rights Committee 1981-2014: GC 34, para. 47).
Free movement and security of journalists
Furthermore, media representatives should be guaranteed freedom of movement dur-
ing the electoral process, to be restricted only under objective, reasonable and non-
discriminatory criteria (ibid.: para. 44), for instance with regard to the accreditation of 
journalists for campaign events due to capacity limits.
Defamation and insult (the Court’s case law)
Facts: the applicant in this case was the manager of a large circulation daily newspaper that in 1993 
published an editorial criticising the Popular Party’s choice of a particular candidate to stand in 
the Lisbon City Council elections. The Lisbon Court of Appeal held that certain expressions used 
by the applicant such as “grotesque”, “buffoonish” and “coarse” were plain insults exceeding the 
limits of freedom of expression. The applicant was eventually convicted on charges of criminal 
libel and ordered to pay a fine, damages and costs.
Law: the Court reiterated that “[f ]reedom of expression constitutes one of the essential founda-
tions of a democratic society” and that it was “applicable not only to ‘information’ or ‘ideas’ that are 
favourably received or regarded as inoffensive or as a matter of indifference, but also to those that 
offend, shock or disturb”. It noted further that “the limits of acceptable criticism … are wider with 
regard to a politician acting in his public capacity”, who “inevitably and knowingly lays himself 
open to close scrutiny of his every word and deed by both journalists and the public at large”. This 
applies “especially when he himself makes public statements that are susceptible of criticism”. The 
Court stated that the personal tone of “political invective often spills over into the personal sphere; 
such are the hazards of politics and the free debate of ideas”. It stressed that journalists may resort 
“to a degree of exaggeration or even provocation”.
Conclusion: violation of Article 10 (freedom of expression).
Source: Lopes Gomes da Silva v. Portugal (28 December 2000).
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{“itemid”:[“001-58817”]}
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Closely linked to the freedom of seeking and receiving information is the security of 
the person. This comprises the right of journalists to be free from physical and emo-
tional violence as well as from arbitrary detentions or arrests preventing them from 
reporting on the electoral process, and legal provisions should provide appropriate 
forms of redress in case of any violation (ibid.: para. 23). In fact, states have a positive 
obligation to protect a journalist’s freedom of expression against attacks (Committee 
of Ministers 2007a: para. I.2).
Neutral attitude of state authorities and media pluralism
To ensure editorial freedom, state authorities should exercise a neutral attitude towards 
the contents of media coverage of elections (Venice Commission 2002: Guidelines, sec-
tion I.3.1.a.i). Public authorities should refrain from interfering in the activities of jour-
nalists and other media personnel with a view to influencing the elections (Committee 
of Ministers 2007a: para. IV.1). The state should refrain from measures that may have 
a chilling effect or indirectly evoke self-censorship, for example by making repeated 
accusations in response to the publication of certain articles, authorising unjustified 
tax inspections or disrupting supplies for newspapers (OSCE/ODIHR 2003b: 97; UN 
Human Rights Committee 1981-2014: GC 32, para. 63).
Publicly owned media, too, must be guaranteed editorial freedom and independence. 
Government officials should not abuse resources or their influence to exert control over 
media content; linked to this, sufficient funding should be provided (UN Human Rights 
Committee 1981-2014: GC 34, para. 16). Particularly, the state must not have a media 
monopoly and should promote pluralism (ibid.: 40), recalling that the diversity of media 
types and content is central to media pluralism (Committee of Ministers 1999). Only 
in these conditions are voters able to receive various kinds of information, enhancing 
their ability to form an informed opinion.
The existence of a high number of state-controlled media outlets was criticised in the 
OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission’s Final Report on the 2010 Presidential 
Election in Belarus.
Equally, states should prevent undue media dominance or concentration by privately 
controlled media groups in monopolistic situations that may be harmful to a diversity 
of sources and views (UN Human Rights Committee 1981-2014: GC 34, para. 40). The 
entire structure of media ownership should be transparent in order to enable people to 
Lack of independent media (Belarus)
The Election Observation Mission noted that despite a high number of officially declared 
media outlets, there was “a general lack of independent and objective reporting. The scarcity 
of alternative information sources significantly reduced the possibility for voters to make an 
informed choice during the election. … The state controls all nationwide broadcast outlets 
as well as the distribution networks for print media. The expression of alternative views on 
political developments is thus confined to a few private newspapers and the Internet”.
Source: OSCE/ODIHR EOM to Belarus, Presidential Election 2010, Final Report, p. 12.
www.osce.org/odihr/elections/75713?download=true
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understand potential biases in their information sources (Committee of Ministers 1994: 
Guideline 1).
b. Broadcast media coverage of the elections
Media coverage of the electoral process by the main segments of a country’s media 
sector, including radio, television, newspapers and the internet, is essential for voters 
to be adequately informed of the electoral contestants’ programmes and opinions. To 
grant this universally, media should take steps to reach all parts of society, including 
those living in rural areas (The Carter Center 2014: 140). Since broadcasting media 
are still the most popular sources for information on the electoral process, they are 
discussed in the following sub-sections.
Fair, balanced and impartial coverage
Both publicly and privately owned broadcasting media, though granted editorial 
freedom, should be obliged to cover elections in a fair, balanced and impartial man-
ner, in particular in their news and current affairs programmes, including discussion 
formats such as interviews and debates (Committee of Ministers 2007a: paras. II.1, 2; 
Venice Commission/OSCE/ODIHR 2009). The role of the media is to persistently monitor 
whether the authorities are ensuring a democratic election process. Since the media 
have an important task in helping the voters understand the key issues of the election, 
they are also expected to reflect on, describe and analyse this process. Accurate and 
balanced coverage comprises different types of broadcasting formats, such as the open 
questioning of candidates and political parties, debates between candidates and the 
presentation of direct statements, instead of mere commentary on a candidate, and 
the dedication of equal amounts of airtime.
A negative example thereto can be found in the Final Report of the OSCE/ODIHR EOM 
to the 2013 Presidential Election in Azerbaijan.
Further, biases or manipulations, for instance the omission of stories that would have a 
negative or positive impact on a candidate, presenting partisan or private interests as 
Inaccurate and preferential coverage of elections (Azerbaijan)
The media monitoring findings of the EOM “revealed limited coverage of candidates and 
a lack of pluralism. The monitored television channels, including ITV [public broadcaster], 
provided a total of 15 hours 44 minutes of coverage in their primetime news programmes; 
an average of some 7 minutes per day. Of this, 92 per cent was dedicated to the incumbent 
President, with the rest to the remaining nine candidates. Coverage tended to focus on 
information regarding the technical aspects of the election. None of the monitored televi-
sion stations broadcast programmes that provided an opportunity for journalists, experts 
or the public to put questions to candidates (including the incumbent) or for candidates to 
debate with each other”.
Source: OSCE/ODIHR EOM to Azerbaijan, Presidential Election 2013, Final Report, p. 16.
www.osce.org/institutions/110015?download=true
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news, or the use of sound effects to promote or diminish a candidate, should be avoided 
(OSCE/ODIHR 2003b: 94). News coverage of the government or the incumbent, though 
admissible during campaign periods, should not be abused via privileged treatment 
of public authorities (Committee of Ministers 2007a: para. II.2).
Regulatory bodies
Election or media law should encompass clear provisions for media coverage of the 
elections. In case of violations of these provisions, expedited and specific remedies 
should be provided (Venice Commission 2002: Explanatory Report, para. 19). For this, 
states may establish an independent regulatory body that oversees broadcasting 
media’s compliance with the legal framework, regulates broadcasting itself and has the 
power to impose sanctions in case of non-compliance (The Carter Center 2014: 135). 
This body should be independent from political interests, especially in the appoint-
ment of its members and functioning, as well as transparent in its structures and deci-
sions (UN Human Rights Committee 1981-2014: GC 34, para. 39). It should deal with 
complaints in a timely manner. The media may also establish self-regulatory bodies 
to ensure compliance with the legal framework either industry-wide or in-house and 
journalists may agree on codes of ethics implementing quality-preserving and trans-
parency-enhancing self-commitments (OSCE 2008: 10, 22).
The need for a regulatory body is exemplified by the Final Report of the OSCE/ODIHR 
Election Observation Mission’s to the 2014 Parliamentary Elections in Moldova.
Provisions for publicly owned media
Public service media should provide adequate information about the democratic system 
and democratic procedures. Accordingly, one of its roles should be to foster citizens’ 
Media regulatory body (Moldova)
The Election Observation Mission noted preferential treatment of the ruling party by various 
television broadcasters, including the most popular TV channels: “Prime TV and Publika TV 
showed clear bias in favour of the Democratic Party of Moldova (PDM), both in amount of 
airtime and tone, devoting to it 36 per cent each of almost exclusively positive and neutral 
information. In addition, PDM campaign reports were often presented outside the special 
bloc dedicated to election coverage. Numerous news reports promoted the activities of 
the speaker of the parliament, also a PDM candidate.”
However, as assessed by the EOM, the media regulatory body (CCA) did not restore media 
compliance with the legal requirement to ensure balance, impartiality and accuracy in their 
news programmes: “during its last pre-election session before election day, the CCA chose 
not to apply further, more severe sanctions, despite the findings of its fourth monitoring 
report that revealed repeated unbalanced coverage by some broadcasters”. This “[f ]ailure 
of the CCA to apply sanctions in an adequate and consistent manner detracted from their 
overall value as a remedy, and questioned the independence of the overseeing authority”.
Source: OSCE/ODIHR EOM to Moldova, Parliamentary Elections 2014, Final Report, pp. 16-18.
www.osce.org/odihr/elections/moldova/144196?download=true
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interest in public affairs and encourage them to play a more active part (Committee 
of Ministers 2007b: para. II.15).
Particularly, publicly owned media should meet certain obligations in order to grant 
candidates equality of opportunity. They can be obliged to provide free airtime and 
space during election periods, to be allotted on a non-discriminatory basis under a 
formula established by law that can be applied objectively (OSCE 1990a: para. 7.8; 
International IDEA 2014a: 202, 229). Equal distribution can be ensured either propor-
tionally, according to the number of seats political parties hold in parliament or their 
results in recent elections, or strictly, that is irrespective of their parliamentary strength 
(Venice Commission 2002: Guidelines, section I.2.3.b). This encompasses the amount 
of free airtime or space provided and its timing or location, including during peak 
viewing or listening periods (OHCHR 1994: para. 121; International IDEA 2014a: 229). 
The amount of airtime distributed should be sufficient to enable all contestants to 
compete effectively and for voters to gain sufficient information.
Last but not least, publicly owned media can be obliged to air voter education pro-
grammes. There is no provision for this in international treaties but in this way states 
can meet their obligation to give effect to the right to vote, as enshrined in several 
treaties (International IDEA 2014a: 230).
Provisions for private media
Concerning private media, the law should encourage the pluralistic expression of 
opinions, ensure minimum access for candidates and oblige private broadcasters to 
cover election campaigns in a fair and impartial manner (Committee of Ministers 2007a: 
para II.1, 2; International IDEA 2014a: 202, 229; Venice Commission 2002: Guidelines, 
section I.2.3.c). However, being legally obliged to provide free airtime for contestants 
may infringe on private broadcasters’ editorial freedom.87
Political advertising in broadcast media
Open access and equal treatment should also be guaranteed with regard to political 
advertising if this is allowed, including equal costs for all candidates (Committee of 
Ministers 2007a: para II.5), which should not be so high as to affect them prohibitively 
or discriminatorily. Especially in countries with a history of state-owned broadcast 
media that provide preferential treatment to the ruling party, paid political advertising 
can be an important means for opposition candidates to present their messages. Yet it 
should be identified as such and must not be confused with news or editorial content 
(International IDEA 2014a: 229). To ensure equal opportunity of candidates, spending 
on advertising can be limited (Venice Commission 2002: Guidelines, section I.2.3.e).
8. OSCE/ODIHR EOM to Moldova, Parliamentary Elections 2014, Final Report, p. 15, available at www.
osce.org/odihr/elections/moldova/144196?download=true, accessed 21 July 2016.
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c. Measures for underrepresented groups
Every contestant should have access to the media without discrimination, according 
to Article 14 of the Convention, regardless of his or her sex, a disability or his or her 
status as a minority member, displaced person, refugee. Furthermore, for traditionally 
underrepresented groups, special measures can temporarily apply to increase their 
presence in the media.
Particularly, it should be ensured that male and female candidates receive equal cover-
age and visibility in the media. In fact, women candidates consistently have less promi-
nence in election coverage in all forms of media, and women’s issues and concerns 
often do not appear as topics for discussion and comment during electoral campaigns.
An example was noted in the OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission’s Final Report 
on the 2012 Parliamentary Elections in Armenia.
Additionally, media should cover female candidates in a non-discriminatory manner 
regarding images selected as well as the tone and language used. Regulatory bod-
ies should promote gender equality in their composition to engage women in their 
decision-making processes (Committee of Ministers 2013: Guidelines A.1, B.4).
In areas with a certain population of national minorities, media coverage of the elec-
tion campaign should be provided in minority languages (OSCE/ODIHR 2003b: 93).
To enable persons with disabilities to take part in political and public life, electoral 
information provided by the media should be accessible, including offers in sign lan-
guage, “easy to read and understand” information and information in alternative formats 
(Council of Europe 2015: 15, 21). Such offers should also take into account public and 
private websites (ibid.: 23).
Female candidates in the media (Armenia)
“OSCE/ODIHR EOM media monitoring found that H1 devoted 4 per cent of its election-related 
news programs to female candidates and party representatives, and public radio 5 per cent. 
This is disproportionately low, given that around 21 per cent of all registered candidates were 
female, and given Armenia’s stated target of 30 per cent women in the legislature.”
The EOM therefore recommended: “The public media should ensure that women are not 
under-represented in their coverage and could undertake temporary special measures (such 
as giving additional airtime to female candidates, requesting parties to nominate female 
candidates for interviews, airing programs on women in politics) to promote women’s politi-
cal participation.”
Source: OSCE/ODIHR EOM to Armenia, Parliamentary Elections 2012, Final Report, pp. 17, 28.
www.osce.org/odihr/elections/91643?download=true
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8. VOTING – TYPES OF VOTING
Voting is the phase of elections during which the largest number of individuals in a 
country exercises the right and opportunity to participate in public affairs. The conduct 
of voting, particularly with regard to its transparency, influences strongly public confi-
dence in the electoral process and acceptance of the results. Every step of the voting 
process should consequently be open to the scrutiny of the political contestants, their 
proxies and election observers (Venice Commission 2002: Guidelines, section I.3.2.x). 
The fundamental objective must be to ensure the free exercise of the right to vote. 
This entails the impartiality of observers. Additionally, all prerequisites for this elec-
tion phase must be addressed by detailed provisions: the voting form, printing and 
secure distribution of ballots, the manner of their casting as well as the type of voting 
(OHCHR 1994: para. 109). Expedited and timely appeals should apply in case of any 
infringement, particularly against decisions taken at polling station level (International 
IDEA 2014a: 248).
In the following sub-sections voting in polling stations, other types of voting and 
voters with specific needs are considered.
a. Voting in a polling station
Generally, voting should always be possible in polling stations that are sufficiently 
equipped and staffed (Venice Commission 2002: Guidelines, section I.3.2.ii; The Carter 
Center 2014: 150). Regulations must address the voting facilities, polling station staff 
and voting material. Further, the role of the voter and the security of the whole pro-
cess are crucial.
Voting facilities
States must provide suitable polling sites in public places that are easily and equally 
accessible for voters (Venice Commission 2002: Explanatory Report, para. 27; The Carter 
Center 2014: 150) with regard to geographical conditions and existing transportation 
means. Freedom of movement must be guaranteed so that voters are able to reach 
their polling station, and the number of polling stations should be proportionate to 
the size of the electorate (The Carter Center 2014: 150). According to the European 
Commission, “[t]he number of voters designated to a polling station is considered 
reasonable when the total number of votes cast can be processed effectively during 
the time available, if all [registered] voters participated” (2008: 75).
Polling stations must provide sufficient space to accommodate all voters and should 
be structured in a manner that allows full visibility of the setting except for the voting 
booths. Voters should be able to pass unhindered each step from the identification 
desk and the place where they receive their ballot paper to the voting booths and the 
ballot box (OSCE/ODIHR 2003a: 72).
Polling facilities should be kept open during a time fixed by law that should be the 
same for all voters. Polls should open on time and not close too early to allow as many 
voters as possible to cast their vote. People waiting in line when the polls close should 
be allowed to vote (The Carter Center 2014: 150).
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Polling station staff
Polling staff should be required to attend training that emphasises their task and their 
duty to act impartially (European Commission 2008: 75).
As a safeguard against electoral fraud, the team of polling staff should be composed in 
a balanced way with regard to political opinions (Venice Commission 2002: Explanatory 
Report, para. 32). Additionally, polling staff should ensure that ballot boxes are empty 
and sealed at the beginning of voting and all unused ballot papers should be rec-
ognised and secured while transporting and storing them (OSCE/ODIHR 2010: 73; 
Venice Commission 2002: Explanatory Report, para. 33). Polling staff should ensure that 
unused ballot papers never leave the polling station (ibid.: Guidelines, section I.3.2.ix). 
They should assess the accuracy of the vote cast’s outcome by recording the number 
of voters and the number of ballot papers placed in the ballot box. Other numbers 
should not be recorded unless this can be done accurately, in order to grant strict and 
effective control (ibid.: Explanatory Report, para. 32). In order to prevent double vot-
ing, measures such as marking the voter register, asking the voter to sign the register, 
or marking his or her finger with ink may apply (European Commission 2008: 76) and 
should be implemented methodically.
Examples of fraudulent practices and irregularities are listed in the OSCE/ODIHR Election 
Observation Mission’s Final Report on the 2012 Parliamentary Elections in Belarus.
Voting material
Voting material includes the equipment of a polling station such as the ballot boxes, 
voting screens and information material on voting as well as, in particular, the ballot 
paper. There has to be sufficient and pre-approved material in place, which has to be 
safeguarded before, during and after voting in order to ensure the free expression of 
the electorate’s will (International IDEA 2014a: 238).
With regard to the ballot paper, it is important that it bears the names of registered 
lists or candidates (Venice Commission 2002: Explanatory Report, para. 27) printed in 
equal size and in a fairly determined order, for example, by drawing lots. However, the 
ballot paper should be designed as simply as possible and easy for voters to fill out to 
avoid confusion and a delay in voting. The use of symbols or photographs to repre-
sent candidates or parties is practised in many countries and may be useful in areas 
with a high level of illiteracy. There should be enough ballot papers for all registered 
Fraudulent practices and irregularities occurring in polling stations (Belarus)
The EOM observed “problems and irregularities” such as “seemingly identical signatures in 
voters’ lists (6 per cent), the ballot box for early voting not being placed in clear view of 
Precinct Election Commission (PEC) members and observers (13 per cent), ballot boxes not 
being properly sealed (5 per cent), and indications of ballot box stuffing in 3 polling stations”.
Source: OSCE/ODIHR EOM to Belarus, Parliamentary Elections 2012, Final Report, p. 19.
www.osce.org/odihr/elections/98146?download=true
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voters and extra ballot papers as a contingency, for example, to replace spoiled bal-
lots. Voters should receive the number of ballot papers to which they are entitled, and 
which is the same for all voters.
Voters
In order to allow the voter to freely express his or her will and to ensure that voting proce-
dures are consistent with the voting principles, they have to meet certain criteria and should 
be kept as simple as possible (ibid.: Guidelines, section I.3.2.i; International IDEA 2014a: 239).
Firstly, the legal framework on voting should clearly ensure the vote’s secrecy and 
security to shield voters from pressure they might face if their vote were known and 
undue control over their choice (OHCHR 1966: Article 25(b); Venice Commission 2002: 
Guidelines, section I.4.b; UN Human Rights Committee 1981-2014: GC 25, para. 20). This 
means that the two steps of identifying qualified voters and voting and casting the 
ballot must be kept separate to prevent the possibility of a link being drawn between 
the voter’s choice and his or her identity (International IDEA 2014a: 238). If the voter 
has collected his or her ballot paper no one else should touch it from that point on 
and no one is allowed to see the marked ballot until counting takes place (ibid.; Venice 
Commission 2002: Explanatory Report, para. 35). Any violation of the secrecy of the 
ballot should be punished, for example by disqualifying the ballot the content of which 
has been disclosed (ibid.: Guidelines, section I.4.a).
A high risk of undue influence and non-compliance with the secrecy of the ballot occurs 
with so-called proxy voting, which allows the delegation of someone’s voting power to 
other voters (proxies) because of his or her inability to attend voting in a regular voting 
place. This should only be allowed for specific circumstances under very strict rules, 
including a limit to the number of proxies per voter (ibid.: section I.3.2.v).
Additionally, all forms of family or group voting should be contested as they infringe 
on the right to vote secretly and individually. Family voting often affects women and 
may happen in three ways: in group voting, where a male family member accompanies 
one or more women relatives into a polling booth; in open voting, when family groups 
vote together; or in the form of proxy voting, where a male family member collects the 
ballot papers that rightfully belong to one or more women relatives and marks those 
papers as he sees fit (Venice Commission 2006a: section b).
Instances of family voting were noted in the OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission’s 
Final Report on the 2012 Parliamentary Elections in Armenia.
In another instance, the OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission to the 2013 
Presidential Election in Azerbaijan in its Final Report noted examples of various infringe-
ments of the secrecy of the vote.
That voting has to be as inclusive as possible has already been discussed in the section 
on voter registration. Voting can be compulsory in order to grant universal suffrage. 
In countries where it is not compulsory, voters must be allowed to not vote without 
facing retribution or punishment (European Commission 2008: 75). Since abstention 
from voting can indicate a political choice, lists of people actually voting should not 
be published to maintain the secrecy of people’s choices.
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Infringements of the secrecy of the vote (Azerbaijan)
The EOM reported that “[i]n 9 per cent of polling stations observed, not all voters marked 
their ballot in secrecy. IEOM observers noted group voting in 7 per cent of polling stations 
observed. In 16 polling stations they observed the same person ‘assisting’ numerous voters, 
potentially undermining the secrecy of the vote. In 8 per cent of those polling stations visited 
that had cameras connected to the internet installed, IEOM observers assessed that their 
placement did not completely safeguard the secrecy of the vote”.
Source: OSCE/ODIHR EOM to Azerbaijan, Presidential Election 2013, Final Report, p. 21.
www.osce.org/institutions/110015?download=true
Security of the voting process
Voters and polling officials must be protected from intimidation or coercive influence 
by state authorities or individuals (Venice Commission 2002: Explanatory Report, 
para. 27; OSCE/ODIHR 2003a: para. 8.5; UN Human Rights Committee 1981-2014: GC 25, 
para. 11). Polling officials are responsible for keeping order in the polling station and, 
as far as possible, in its immediate environment (OSCE/ODIHR 2003a: para. 8.5). Police 
and security forces should only enter polling stations to vote themselves or, on the 
request of polling station officials, to restore order in a concrete event of disturbance 
(International IDEA 2014a: 239). Only the presiding polling officer or his or her rep-
resentative should be authorised to let police intervene. (Venice Commission 2002: 
Explanatory Report, para. 112). Although the presence of security personnel or police 
in polling stations is common in some countries, this can only be admissible as long as 
voters are not unduly influenced or intimidated (OHCHR 1994: paras. 94, 97).
The maintenance of order in polling stations and their security was highlighted in 
the OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission’s Final Report on the 2013 Presidential 
Election in Armenia.
Family voting (Armenia)
The EOM observed a number of serious violations to the secrecy and individuality of the vote 
including family voting. It explained: “Issues of intimidation and compromised secrecy of the 
vote are generally regarded as having a greater impact on female voters, as more powerful 
male family and community members can use their enhanced position to pressure women 
whom to vote for.” Further, it criticised the fact that “[n]o additional measures, such as increased 
protection of the secrecy of the vote and additional voter education and outreach to women 
voters, were taken by the CEC to prevent men from influencing women’s votes”.
Source: OSCE/ODIHR EOM to Armenia, Parliamentary Election 2012, Final Report, p. 21.
www.osce.org/odihr/elections/91643?download=true
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b. Other types of voting
States can consider special voting procedures or voting in other locations that can take 
place in advance of election day and supplement voting in polling stations, to facilitate 
voting and thus contribute to broad participation in elections in the sense of universal 
suffrage (OSCE/ODIHR 2003a: para. 8.10; International IDEA 2014a: 142). They should 
clearly define the conditions for those procedures, which must comprise safeguards 
against multiple voting and undue influence of voters (International IDEA 2014a: 239).
Through postal voting, voters are allowed to cast their ballot in advance of election 
day. In some jurisdictions postal voting is not allowed because the secrecy of the vote 
cannot be guaranteed (ibid.: 240). In any case, it should only be admissible if the postal 
service is safe from intentional interferences, is reliable, and the jurisdiction in question 
does not have a history of family voting or other trends that result in voters control-
ling the vote of another voter (Venice Commission 2002: Guidelines, section I.3.2.iii, 
Explanatory Report, para. 39).
Electronic voting or e-voting is a relatively new voting technology that can enhance voter 
participation and provide for faster counting that is less prone to human error, as well 
as being more cost-effective. However, the use of e-voting may raise serious concerns 
over the transparency of the voting process, that is the traceability of an individual’s 
vote (European Commission 2008: 84). According to the Code of Good Practice and 
the Committee of Minister’s Recommendation Rec(2004)11, state authorities should 
hence ensure that e-voting technologies applied function correctly, safely and reliably. 
In particular, it must be possible during voting to check whether the system is func-
tioning properly; it should withstand breakdowns, malfunction and deliberate attacks.
Several shortcomings were noted by the OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission’s 
Final Report on the 2014 Parliamentary Elections in Moldova.
Furthermore, an e-voting system must ensure the secrecy of the vote, that is never 
link the voter’s identity with his or her vote, and be sufficiently secure against fraud. 
Its interface must be designed in a clear, non-confusing way. The voter should be able 
Maintenance of order and security (Armenia)
The EOM noted: “Observers reported overcrowding inside 51 stations observed (5 per cent), 
large groups of voters waiting outside 77 stations (8 per cent), and tension or unrest at 18 
stations (2 per cent). They also reported 64 cases (7 per cent of observations) where unau-
thorized people, mostly proxies, interfered in or directed the work of the PECs. Observers 
reported 9 cases of people inside stations attempting to influence voters who to vote for, as 
well as 30 cases of pressure on or intimidation of voters outside stations.”
It therefore recommended: “Further steps should be taken to address the persistent problem of 
interference in the electoral process by unauthorized people. Overcrowding of polling stations 
and Territorial Election Commissions (TEC) should be addressed, for example by identifying 
sufficiently large premises and by more efficient control over who is inside these premises.”
Source: OSCE/ODIHR EOM to Armenia, Presidential Election 2013, Final Report, p. 21.
www.osce.org/odihr/elections/101314?download=true
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to correct her/his choice before casting the ballot, should be aware when her/his vote 
has been cast and should receive a confirmation of the vote. To facilitate verification 
and a recount in the case of appeals, it might be possible to print the votes onto a ballot 
paper that is then placed in a sealed container.
Further voting types are linked to special voting sites such as so-called mobile voting, 
which either takes place on election day or less often, in advance. In that case, polling 
officials visit homebound voters with a mobile ballot box. However, this method bears 
a high risk of fraud so it should only be admissible if strict safeguards apply (Venice 
Commission 2002: Guidelines, section I.3.2.vi).
An example of mobile voting and its risks can be found in the Final Report of the OSCE/
ODIHR Election Observation Mission to the 2012 Parliamentary Elections in Belarus.
Military voting concerns voting by military personnel, who should be able to vote 
at their place of residence or at a designated local polling station near their barracks 
(Venice Commission 2002: Guidelines, section I.3.2.xi). Only if this not possible because 
the barracks are too far from the nearest polling station should members of the armed 
forces be asked to vote at their place of deployment. However, military personnel 
must not be intimidated or coerced to vote in a certain way by their superiors (ibid.: 
Explanatory Report, para. 41).
States can allow out-of-country voting for expatriate citizens (International 
IDEA 2014a: 240), which can take place at special polling stations such as a country’s 
embassy, or through the post.
Shortcomings related to electronic list of voters (Moldova)
The EOM observed: “Upon opening, the SAISE [State Automated Information System ‘Elections’] 
was operational in 95 per cent of precincts observed. However, later that morning, the system 
stopped functioning. According to the CEC, its server network went down due to an overload 
of requests from Precinct Election Bureaus (PEB). The SAISE did not function during 59 per cent 
of the visits by the observers. As a result of this significant technical problem, voters’ data was 
initially processed manually by PEBs, and then subsequently added to the electronic system.”
Source: OSCE/ODIHR EOM to Moldova, Parliamentary Elections 2014, Final Report, p. 22.
www.osce.org/odihr/elections/moldova/144196?download=true
Inaccuracies in mobile voting procedures (Belarus)
The EOM noted: “The electoral code provides for mobile voting for those unable to visit a 
polling station in person regardless of the reason. In some precincts, more than one third of 
voters casting their ballot on election day used mobile voting. Ballot boxes for mobile voting 
were not securely sealed in 94 per cent of cases, and there were indications of ballot box 
stuffing of the mobile voting ballot boxes in five polling stations observed.”
It therefore suggested: “Mobile voting could be limited to homebound voters with a compelling 
reason. These voters could be required to file a motivated request in advance of election day.”
Source: OSCE/ODIHR EOM to Belarus, Parliamentary Elections 2012, Final Report, p. 19.
www.osce.org/odihr/elections/98146?download=true
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c. Voters with specific needs
Voting should take place without any discrimination on prohibited grounds, as speci-
fied by Article 14 of the Convention. However, special measures can (temporarily) apply 
where voters have specific needs.
States should grant voters with disabilities the right and possibility to vote on an equal 
basis with others, that is secretly and individually by marking their ballot directly with-
out any intimidation (ibid.: 141). Hence the voting procedure, facilities and their layout 
as well as materials should be appropriate, accessible and easy to understand and use 
(UN 2006: Article 29(a)(i)). This can also comprise the usage of auxiliary and new tech-
nologies where appropriate, such as e-voting technologies or Braille (ibid.: Article 29(a)
(ii); Committee of Ministers 2004: para. 3; International IDEA 2014a: 142). The only excep-
tion to the right (and duty) of voters to the secrecy of the ballot is when a voter who is 
not able to vote independently requires personal assistance (International IDEA 2014a: 
239). This should be executed impartially by someone of the voter’s own choice or by 
another person chosen in a neutral manner, for example an official assistant provided 
by the EA, who shall be obliged under threat of punishment to respect the intent of 
the voter and the secrecy of his or her vote (ibid.: 142; UN 2006: Article 29(a)(iii); The 
Carter Center 2014: 151). Voters with disabilities should be made aware of the oppor-
tunity of assisted voting (UN Human Rights Committee 1981-2014: GC 25, para. 20).
Election material, including ballot papers, should be translated into minority languages 
in multilingual societies (ibid.: para. 12; OSCE/ODIHR 2010: 54). If translated, ballot 
papers must be identical in their content in every language (OHCHR 1994: para. 110). 
In minority areas, too, enough polling stations must be provided and equal access must 
be guaranteed to members of minorities (International IDEA 2014a: 247).
IDPs who were displaced in advance of voting should be able to return to the place 
where they are registered to cast their ballot (OHCHR 2004: Principle 22(d)). Furthermore, 
refugees should be able to return to their country to vote (OHCHR 1966: Article 12(4)).
Page 80 ► Using international election standards
Vo
tin
g
(s
ta
nd
ar
ds
 a
nd
 g
oo
d 
pr
ac
tic
es
)
O
SC
E/
O
D
IH
R 
EO
M
 
Re
fe
re
nc
e 
(fi
na
l r
ep
or
ts
)
Vo
tin
g 
in
 a
po
lli
ng
 st
at
io
n
Th
e 
vo
tin
g 
pr
oc
ed
ur
e 
m
us
t b
e 
ke
pt
 si
m
pl
e.
G
eo
rg
ia
 2
01
3,
 p
. 2
1
Th
e 
st
at
e 
m
us
t p
ro
vi
de
 th
e 
ne
ce
ss
ar
y 
pr
em
ise
s f
or
 v
ot
in
g.
Ar
m
en
ia
 2
01
3,
 p
. 2
1
M
ol
do
va
 2
01
4,
 p
. 2
2
Po
lli
ng
 st
at
io
ns
 m
us
t b
e 
su
ffi
ci
en
tly
 e
qu
ip
pe
d 
an
d 
st
aff
ed
.
M
ol
do
va
 2
01
4,
 p
. 2
2
U
kr
ai
ne
 M
ay
 2
01
4,
 p
. 2
6
El
ec
tio
n 
an
d 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
m
at
er
ia
l m
us
t b
e 
pr
es
en
t.
Ar
m
en
ia
 2
01
3,
 p
. 2
1
Th
e 
vo
tin
g 
pr
oc
es
s m
us
t e
ns
ur
e 
th
at
 v
ot
er
s a
re
 a
bl
e 
to
 c
as
t t
he
ir 
vo
te
s a
s t
he
y 
w
ish
 w
ith
-
ou
t h
av
in
g 
to
 fa
ce
 re
tr
ib
ut
io
n,
 c
oe
rc
io
n 
or
 in
tim
id
at
io
n,
 e
ith
er
 fr
om
 th
e 
au
th
or
iti
es
 o
r f
ro
m
 
in
di
vi
du
al
s.
Ar
m
en
ia
 2
01
3,
 p
. 2
0
U
kr
ai
ne
 M
ay
 2
01
4,
 p
. 2
5
Th
e 
se
cr
ec
y 
of
 th
e 
ba
llo
t m
us
t b
e 
ob
se
rv
ed
 d
ur
in
g 
th
e 
en
tir
e 
vo
tin
g 
pr
oc
ed
ur
e,
 p
ar
tic
ul
ar
ly
 
du
rin
g 
th
e 
ca
st
in
g 
of
 v
ot
es
.
Az
er
ba
ija
n 
20
13
, p
. 2
1
M
ol
do
va
 2
01
5,
 p
. 2
1
In
 p
ar
tic
ul
ar
, f
am
ily
 v
ot
in
g 
in
fri
ng
es
 o
n 
th
e 
se
cr
ec
y 
of
 th
e 
ba
llo
t a
nd
 is
 a
 c
om
m
on
 v
io
la
tio
n 
of
 th
e 
el
ec
to
ra
l l
aw
.
Ar
m
en
ia
 2
01
2,
 p
. 2
1
M
ul
tip
le
 v
ot
in
g 
an
d 
an
y 
co
nt
ro
l b
y 
on
e 
vo
te
r o
ve
r a
no
th
er
’s 
vo
te
 m
us
t b
e 
pr
oh
ib
ite
d.
U
kr
ai
ne
 2
01
2,
 p
. 2
7
Ar
m
en
ia
 2
01
3,
 p
. 2
1
Sa
fe
gu
ar
ds
 a
ga
in
st
 e
le
ct
or
al
 fr
au
d 
an
d 
co
rr
up
tio
n 
sh
ou
ld
 b
e 
im
po
se
d 
an
d 
im
pl
em
en
te
d 
co
rre
ct
ly
.
Ar
m
en
ia
 2
01
2,
 p
. 2
1
Az
er
ba
ija
n 
20
13
, p
. 2
0
El
ec
to
ra
l f
ra
ud
 a
nd
 co
rr
up
tio
n 
ar
e 
m
or
e 
un
lik
el
y 
if 
th
e 
po
lli
ng
 st
at
io
n 
offi
ci
al
s r
ep
re
se
nt
 d
if-
fe
re
nt
 p
ol
iti
ca
l g
ro
up
in
gs
.
U
kr
ai
ne
 2
01
2,
 p
. 1
0
Az
er
ba
ija
n 
20
13
, p
. 2
1
Application and good practices ► Page 81
Vo
tin
g 
in
 a
po
lli
ng
 st
at
io
n
In
 o
rd
er
 to
 e
ns
ur
e 
th
e 
ac
cu
ra
cy
 o
f r
es
ul
ts
 th
e 
nu
m
be
r o
f v
ot
er
s a
nd
 th
e 
nu
m
be
r o
f b
al
lo
t 
pa
pe
rs
 re
ce
iv
ed
 a
t e
ac
h 
po
lli
ng
 st
at
io
n 
sh
ou
ld
 b
e 
re
co
rd
ed
.
G
eo
rg
ia
 2
01
3,
 p
. 2
0
El
ec
tio
n 
ob
se
rv
er
s a
nd
 th
e 
co
nt
es
ta
nt
s o
r t
he
ir 
ag
en
ts
 sh
ou
ld
 b
e 
al
lo
w
ed
 to
 b
e 
pr
es
en
t u
nd
er
 
th
e 
pr
em
ise
 th
at
 th
ey
 a
ct
 im
pa
rt
ia
lly
 a
nd
 re
fra
in
 fr
om
 in
te
rfe
re
nc
e.
Az
er
ba
ija
n 
20
13
, p
. 2
1,
 2
8
G
eo
rg
ia
 2
01
3,
 p
. 2
0
M
ol
do
va
 2
01
5,
 p
. 2
1
El
ec
tio
n 
da
y-
re
la
te
d 
co
m
pl
ai
nt
s s
ho
ul
d 
be
 co
ns
id
er
ed
 im
m
ed
ia
te
ly
.
Ar
m
en
ia
 2
01
2,
 p
. 2
2,
 2
8
O
th
er
 ty
pe
s
of
 v
ot
in
g
St
ric
t c
on
di
tio
ns
 an
d 
sa
fe
gu
ar
ds
 ag
ai
ns
t f
ra
ud
 sh
ou
ld
 b
e 
im
po
se
d 
fo
r m
ob
ile
 vo
tin
g,
 in
cl
ud
in
g 
se
al
in
g 
th
e 
ba
llo
t b
ox
 a
nd
 th
e 
at
te
nd
an
ce
 o
f s
ev
er
al
 p
ol
lin
g 
offi
ci
al
s r
ep
re
se
nt
in
g 
di
ffe
re
nt
 
po
lit
ic
al
 g
ro
up
in
gs
.
Ar
m
en
ia
 2
01
2,
 p
. 2
1
Be
la
ru
s 2
01
2,
 p
. 1
9
Az
er
ba
ija
n 
20
13
, p
. 2
1
E-
vo
tin
g 
m
us
t b
e 
se
cu
re
, r
el
ia
bl
e 
an
d 
tr
an
sp
ar
en
t. 
It 
is 
im
po
rt
an
t t
o 
en
su
re
 th
at
 e
-v
ot
in
g 
sy
st
em
s a
re
 d
es
ig
ne
d 
in
 a
 n
on
-c
on
fu
sin
g 
w
ay
.
M
ol
do
va
 2
01
4,
 p
. 2
2
Sp
ec
ia
l
m
ea
su
re
s
Po
lli
ng
 st
at
io
ns
 sh
ou
ld
 b
e 
ac
ce
ss
ib
le
 to
 v
ot
er
s w
ith
 d
isa
bi
lit
ie
s a
nd
 th
ei
r l
ay
ou
t m
us
t b
e 
ad
eq
ua
te
.
Ar
m
en
ia
 2
01
3,
 p
. 2
1
M
ol
do
va
 2
01
4,
 p
. 2
2
U
kr
ai
ne
 O
ct
. 2
01
4,
 p
. 2
6
Po
sit
iv
e 
m
ea
su
re
s s
ho
ul
d 
be
 ta
ke
n 
to
 o
ve
rc
om
e 
ill
ite
ra
cy
 a
m
on
g 
vo
te
rs
.
U
kr
ai
ne
 O
ct
. 2
01
4,
 p
. 2
2
A 
su
ffi
ci
en
t n
um
be
r o
f b
al
lo
t p
ap
er
s s
ho
ul
d 
be
 a
va
ila
bl
e 
in
 m
in
or
ity
 la
ng
ua
ge
s.
M
ol
do
va
 2
01
1,
 p
. 2
1
G
eo
rg
ia
 2
01
2,
 p
. 2
3
Az
er
ba
ija
n 
20
13
, p
. 1
9
Page 82 ► Using international election standards
9. COUNTING AND RESULTS MANAGEMENT
Vote counting and the tabulation of results are sensitive parts of the electoral process, 
since at this point the winners and losers of the electoral contest are determined. 
A balance has to be maintained between providing results in a timely manner and 
ensuring procedural accuracy aimed at respecting and establishing the voters’ wishes. 
Inaccuracies and manipulations during this part of the electoral process can seriously 
undermine public confidence in the integrity of the entire electoral process and the 
acceptance of results. Transparency and access to information should accompany 
counting and tabulation procedures.
a. The vote count
Counting procedures should be regulated by a law that provides for a transparent, 
immediate, accurate, honest and secure count (European Commission 2008: 82; 
OSCE 1990a: para. 7.4). Particularly, there should be strict deadlines for the closing 
of polling stations, deadlines and conditions for the counting of advance votes (e.g. 
postal votes and electronic votes when the system closes before the end of the voting 
period, as is usually the case with internet voting), and well-defined conditions for the 
appointment of personnel in charge of the counting. The location where the counting 
takes place should be defined as well as procedures for reconciliation, the counting 
itself and transfer of the results. The procedures should be simple and tested well in 
advance and their application reflected in the manual for polling station staff (Venice 
Commission 2002: Explanatory Report, para. 48).
The vote count procedure can be separated into several steps, comprising the closing 
of voting and the counting itself, the recording of results as well as their transmission, 
and the transport of election material to the higher commissions. A special set of 
standards applies for the determination of the results of e-voting.
The closing of voting and the counting of votes
Counting should start immediately after the closing of a given polling station to reduce 
the risk of fraudulent interferences (European Commission 2008: 82). On the other 
hand, counting should not begin if any type of voting is still taking place. However, 
advanced votes may be counted prior to the end of the voting to speed up the tabula-
tion of results provided that there are clear rules to protect the secrecy of the results 
until the voting period ends (Committee of Ministers 2004: para. 53).
Only authorised and trained staff should participate in the vote counting, which should 
be carried out in an atmosphere free from intimidation (European Commission 2008: 
82). Universal suffrage demands that all votes cast be counted. There should be safe-
guards against electoral fraud and corruption as well as sanctions in case of violations 
of the electoral law (OHCHR 1994: para. 118).
Counting may be carried out on-site, that is at the polling station, or at a central location 
(European Commission 2008: 82). The latter may provide a more controlled environment 
and, in mixing ballot papers from different polling stations, address concerns that voters 
of individual polling stations might be punished for their vote. During the transfer to 
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the counting centre, the ballot box must be properly sealed and permanently super-
vised. Party or candidate representatives and observers should be allowed to supervise 
the transport of the ballot box throughout the process (ibid.: 82). However, there is a 
high risk of electoral fraud when counting takes place outside the polling stations. For 
these reasons it is highly recommended that counting takes place at the polling station 
(Venice Commission 2002: Explanatory Report, para. 45).
After the closing of the vote, the ballot box should be promptly sealed and the unused, 
spoiled and returned ballot papers should be counted and subsequently secured or 
destroyed. Only after this should the sealed ballot box be opened (OSCE/ODIHR 2010: 80).
After the opening of the sealed ballot box, the number of ballots inside should be 
compared with the number of people who actually voted according to the voter list 
(ibid.). The ballot box should not contain more ballots than the registration of actually 
cast ballots reveals (European Commission 2008: 83).
Examples of non-compliances with these standards are listed in the OSCE/ODIHR Election 
Observation Mission’s Final Report on the 2013 Parliamentary Elections in Azerbaijan.
After reconciliation, the ballots for each candidate or party should be separated and 
individually counted (OSCE/ODIHR 2010: 81). The criteria determining the validity of a 
ballot must be clearly set by law (International IDEA 2014a: 251). In case of doubt as to 
whether a ballot is valid, officials should attempt to detect the voter’s intention (Venice 
Commission 2002: Explanatory Report, para. 49). If it is clearly recognisable, the bal-
lot should be considered valid, given that there are no markings that could reveal the 
identity of the voter (European Commission 2008: 83). Invalid ballot papers should be 
kept separately and preserved for review (OSCE/ODIHR 2010: 81). In case of discrepan-
cies at the end of counting, a narrow result or a high number of invalid votes, a recount 
may be immediately necessary (European Commission 2008: 83).
The process of counting should be transparent and open to public scrutiny, that is 
voters registered in the polling station, accredited observers, party or candidate and 
media representatives should be allowed to be present (Venice Commission 2002: 
Explanatory Report, para. 46; UN Human Rights Committee 1981-2014: GC 25, para. 20). 
This means that they have access to facilities and a full view of the counting process 
Severe violations at the beginning of the counting procedure (Azerbaijan)
The EOM noted that “[a] significant proportion of PECs did not perform basic rec-
onciliation procedures, such as counting the number of signatures on the voter 
lists (55 observations), determining the number of voters who voted using a DVC 
[de-registration voting card] (32 observations), and mandatory crosschecks (50 observations), 
which are essential to maintaining the integrity of the process. In 21 counts observed, the 
unused ballot papers were not cancelled prior to the opening of the ballot boxes. In 13 polling 
stations observed, the serial number of the seal was not identical to the number recorded 
during opening procedures; in 4 polling stations ballot box seals were not intact.”
Source: OSCE/ODIHR EOM to Azerbaijan, Parliamentary Elections 2013, Final Report, p. 22.
www.osce.org/institutions/110015?download=true
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and may inspect all counting documents such as protocols and tally sheets as well as 
decisions that can affect the outcome (International IDEA 2014a: 250).
This is noted in the OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission’s Final Report on the 2013 
Parliamentary Elections in Azerbaijan.
Recording of results
The results of the count should be correctly recorded in the official results proto-
col, which should be signed by all authorised persons, that is polling station officials 
(OSCE 1990a: para. 7.4; OSCE/ODIHR 2003b: 103). Records should not be filled in with 
pencil since this can be easily erased (Venice Commission 2002: Explanatory Report, 
para. 47). Recorded figures should be reconciled. All present party or candidate rep-
resentatives and observers should receive copies of the records (ibid.: para. 46). Once 
counting is completed and with a view to provide an opportunity for public scrutiny 
of results, a copy of the records should be posted at the polling station (ibid.).
Transmission of results and transport
After the completion of the counting, the results must be immediately transmitted to 
the higher-level election commission. This should be done in an open manner, either 
by fax or through computer networks (Venice Commission 2002: Explanatory Report, 
para. 51; OSCE/ODIHR 2010: 82). As a safeguard, all polling materials, such as the records, 
the ballot papers and the ballot box, should be secured and directly transported to the 
higher-level election commission accompanied by the presiding officer and two polling 
station officials with differing political preferences (International IDEA 2014a: 251). If elec-
tions take place under strict security measures, the transport might also be supervised 
by the security forces, which are obliged to act impartially (Venice Commission 2002: 
Explanatory Report, para. 50). Also, observers and party or candidate representatives 
should be able to track the counting through the various levels up to the finally con-
solidated results (International IDEA 2014a: 251). This enhances their ability to detect 
irregularities, thus ensuring respect for the free expression of the electors’ will.
The ballots should be preserved in order to be used as evidence in case of complaints 
(Committee of Ministers 2004: para. 98). They should be kept in a secure place, at 
Transparency and scrutiny of the counting process (Azerbaijan)
The EOM noted that “[t]he vote count often lacked transparency. IEOM observers reported 
that in 24 polling stations observed, they did not have a clear view of the counting proce-
dures and in one third of counts observers were not able to clearly see how ballots had been 
marked. In 17 polling stations observed, citizen and international observers were not allowed 
to examine the ballots upon request”.
Source: OSCE/ODIHR EOM to Azerbaijan, Parliamentary Elections 2013, Final Report, p. 22.
www.osce.org/institutions/110015?download=true
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least until election appeals are finally resolved. Additionally, any objections to count-
ing procedures should be recorded and attached to the results sheet (International 
IDEA 2014a: 251).
Several inaccuracies that occurred during the process of counting are presented in the 
OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission’s Final Report on the 2012 Parliamentary 
Elections in Belarus.
Determination of the results of e-voting
There are several ways to determine the results of e-voting. Since technical operations 
are less visible, clear and transparent procedures are needed to create confidence.
According to the Council of Europe e-voting handbook (2010), if recording devices are 
employed on-site, counting may be conducted at the polling station (e.g. by printing or 
storing the results on a separate media device). In case the count is required at a higher 
level of the EA, the storage device must be transported to the relevant location. After 
counting, the results may be transmitted via an (encrypted) internet line, which should 
be protected from any form of manipulative influences, and simultaneously a second 
means of transmission should be used to verify the results. If two versions of the results 
exist (such as electronic and printed), they should be transported separately. In order 
to prevent manipulations, the responsible official should be obliged to transmit the 
results immediately to the higher level.
Inaccuracies in the counting process (Belarus)
The EOM noted that “[b]efore opening ballot boxes, spoiled ballot papers were not counted 
in 17 per cent of polling stations, the total number of voters in the voters list was not estab-
lished and announced in 21 per cent of observed counts and the total number of voters who 
received ballot papers was not established and announced in 23 per cent of cases, as required 
by the Electoral Code”. Furthermore, it reported “that the count was often conducted in silence 
and that they [the IEOM members] were not given a meaningful opportunity to observe the 
count in 36 per cent of polling stations. The results by candidate were not announced in 29 
per cent of counts observed. Problems with reconciling results were observed in 76 per 
cent of polling stations observed during the completion of the protocols. Results were not 
checked against the control equations in 20 per cent of polling stations observed, figures 
were not recorded accurately in 13 per cent of cases, and official protocols were pre-signed 
by PEC members in 11 polling stations [of 125 stations observed]. Protocols from PECs were 
not immediately submitted to DECs in four cases observed.”
The EOM therefore recommended that “[c]lear, open, and transparent procedures for the count 
should be established and strictly implemented by the PECs. Consideration should be given 
to announcing the mark on each ballot and showing it to commission members, observers, 
and candidate proxies. The tallying of results and completion of results protocols should be 
conducted in an open manner that provides for meaningful observation of the process.”
Source: OSCE/ODIHR EOM to Belarus, Parliamentary Elections 2012, Final Report, p. 20.
www.osce.org/odihr/elections/98146?download=true
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Votes cast using the internet need to be counted at a central level. A cast vote might 
be immediately transmitted to a central electronic ballot box or stored at the polling 
station and transmitted after the voting is completed.
Useful guidance on e-voting is provided by Recommendation Rec(2004)11 of the 
Committee of Ministers:
 – the e-voting system shall not allow the disclosure of the number of votes cast 
for any voting option until after the closure of the electronic ballot box;
 – any decoding required for the counting of the votes shall be carried out as soon 
as practicable after the closure of the voting period;
 – when counting the votes, representatives of the competent EA shall be able to 
participate in, and any observers shall be able to observe, the count;
 – a record of the counting process of the electronic votes shall be kept, including 
information about the start and end of the process, and the persons involved 
in the count;
 – there shall be the possibility of a recount. Other features of the e-voting system 
that may influence the correctness of the results shall be verifiable.
b. Tabulation of results
The tabulation of results is their aggregation after they are reported by polling stations 
or the EA level above with a view to analysing and portraying them in a clearly arranged 
manner (International IDEA 2014a: 342). According to Article 14 of the Convention and 
in line with the principle of secrecy of the vote, tabulation of results should be done 
in a non-discriminatory way (The Carter Center 2014: 171). Since manipulation and 
mistakes may occur during tabulation in particular, observers and party or candidate 
representatives should be allowed to access tabulation facilities and be passed copies 
of protocols and tabulation sheets (OSCE/ODIHR 2003b: 111; The Carter Center 2014: 
170). Additionally, parallel vote tabulation, that is observers collecting results and tabu-
lating them independently, should be allowed to enhance confidence in the process 
and help assess the credibility of the results (OHCHR 1994: para. 112).
c. Publication of results
The method of publication and the format of results should be mandated by the legal 
framework. EAs are asked to proactively put information of public interest in the public 
domain (UN 2003: Article 10). That information comprises election results that must be 
published in an expeditious manner with sufficient details for each level allowing for 
examination (OSCE 1990a: para. 7.4; OSCE/ODIHR 2010: 82). Simultaneously, certified 
results should be handed out to observers (International IDEA 2014a: 250). The results 
should include the actual number of votes cast, not just percentages. Furthermore, the 
results should be published disaggregated by polling station to allow traceability and 
contestability (ibid.: 256), “except in highly exceptional circumstances where identify-
ing the geographical distribution of the results of voting could lead to discrimination, 
retributions, or other severe adverse action against a local or regional population” 
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(OSCE/ODIHR 2003a: 73). These exceptions must be prescribed by law and open to 
judicial review.
Depending on the timeframe of their publication, two types of results can be distin-
guished (Venice Commission 2002: Explanatory Report, para. 50):
 ► “provisional” results, which are tabulation snapshots, incomplete and not legally 
binding, and often aired by the media;
 ► “final” results, complete and official results, which may still be appealed.
The continuous reporting of provisional results is particularly sensitive as they could 
be misleading. Reporting should clearly state that the final results may significantly 
differ from provisional results (ibid.: para. 51).
The requirements for the publication of results are summarised in the OSCE/ODIHR Election 
Observation Mission’s Final Report on the Parliamentary Elections in Belarus in 2012.
d. Implementation of results
To respect the results of genuine elections is mandatory for all electoral stakeholders 
and the international community (UN Human Rights Committee 1981-2014: GC 25, 
para. 19). However, this does not mean that results are not contestable in case of 
irregularities. It must be possible to challenge and invalidate questionable election 
results and to organise recounts or new elections at any or all polling stations in cases 
of doubt (OHCHR 1994: para. 112; International IDEA 2014a: 251). Hence, judicial review 
or equivalent processes should be established by law for clearly and unambiguously 
regulated situations (International IDEA 2014a: 251; UN Human Rights Committee 1981-
2014: GC 25, para. 20).
Finally, results must be implemented, that is it must be ensured that candidates who 
obtained the necessary number of votes are enabled to take office and remain there 
for the time prescribed by law (OSCE 1990a: para. 7.9). The legal framework must clearly 
state the electoral formula that is used to convert votes into legislative seats. Protection 
of the mandate of elected officials does not exclude the possibility of removing elected 
officials from office under circumstances prescribed by law that must not be discrimi-
natory or arbitrarily applied (International IDEA 2014a: 251).
Requirements for the publication of election results (Belarus)
The EOM noted that the CEC published only limited results, not disaggregated by polling 
station. Because of this, electoral stakeholders could not check the accuracy of the tabulated 
results. The EOM concluded that this undermined transparency and limited the possibility 
of submitting complaints.
The EOM noted that “preliminary and final results should be published with a complete 
breakdown of the vote by district and polling station. Results should not only include the 
total number of voters and turnout at each polling station, but also the numbers of valid 
and invalid votes, votes cast for each candidate, votes cast against all candidates, and the 
number of spoiled ballot papers.”
Source: OSCE/ODIHR EOM to Belarus, Parliamentary Elections 2012, Final Report, p. 21.
www.osce.org/odihr/elections/98146?download=true
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10. ELECTORAL COMPLAINTS
Any failure to comply with electoral law must be open to appeal in order to under-
score the legality of the electoral process and give effect to citizens’ electoral rights. 
Consequently, complaints may aim to correct decisions, eliminate violations or invalidate 
fully or partially election results. The handling of complaints influences the credibility 
of the electoral process and its results. However, the procedures may vary greatly from 
country to country – depending on political or historical background – and may range 
from formal judicial proceedings to more informal dispute resolution mechanisms.
This section deals with possible grounds for complaints and electoral offences, 
the complainants, the complaint bodies and the complaint procedure.
a. Grounds for complaint and electoral offences
Breaches of the electoral law must be subject to complaints so the law can be effectively 
implemented (Venice Commission 2002: Explanatory Report, para. 92). Complaints can 
be related to any stage in the electoral process (International IDEA 2014a: 261), includ-
ing the electoral system and boundary delimitation, decisions taken by the EA, voter 
lists, the validity of candidatures, the election campaign or party funding, access to and 
coverage of the media, as well as irregularities during voting, counting and tabulation 
or issues with the results themselves. The law should define clearly the grounds on 
which complaints are permissible (The Carter Center 2014: 174).
Additionally, electoral offences such as electoral fraud, voter intimidation or multiple 
voting should be investigated and those responsible for the violation, whether indi-
viduals, officials or entities, should be held accountable (OSCE/ODIHR 2010: 52; UN 
Human Rights Committee 1981-2014: GC 31, paras. 8, 15; International IDEA 2014a: 
272). Election and party legislation and/or framework legislation (civil and penal codes) 
should clearly specify election-related offences (by voters, candidates, parties, their rep-
resentatives/observers, media, electoral and public officials, etc.) and effective, though 
proportionate, sanctions for such offences (International IDEA 2014a: 272). Sentenced 
officials should not be reappointed for future elections.98
b. Complainants
Complaints must be allowed as broadly as possible. At least each candidate, voter and 
party registered in the constituency concerned must be entitled to appeal. A reason-
able quorum may however be imposed for appeals by voters challenging the election 
results (Venice Commission 2002: Guidelines, section II.3.3.f ). Additionally, CSOs and 
observers should have the possibility to challenge election-related decisions. It should 
be clearly regulated who may file a complaint, which must be done non-discrimina-
torily, since all people enjoy equal protection by the law (OHCHR 1966: Article 26; The 
Carter Center 2014: 179). This comprises, in particular, equal access to justice regard-
less of gender or affiliation to a national minority, as emphasised by Article 14 of the 
Convention (Council of Europe 2013: Strategic objective 3). Moreover, there must not 
9. OSCE/ODIHR EOM to FYROM, Municipal Elections 2005, Final Report, p. 24, available at www.osce.
org/odihr/elections/fyrom/15401?download=true, accessed 21 July 2016.
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be unreasonably high fees for legal proceedings, as this may prevent people from 
appealing (UN Human Rights Committee 1981-2014: GC 32, para. 11).
c. Complaint bodies
Electoral complaints should be heard in the first instance either by an electoral commis-
sion or a court while it must be possible to make a final appeal to a court that is entitled 
to examine the substance of the case (OSCE/ODIHR 2010: 51; Venice Commission 2002: 
Guidelines, section II.3.3.a). Concerning parliamentary elections, there might be the 
opportunity to file a complaint to the parliament, provided that a judicial review is 
possible (OHCHR 1966: Article 2(3)(b); Venice Commission 2002: Explanatory Report, 
para. 94). Any complaint body should be competent and impartial (OHCHR 1966: 
Article 14(1); OSCE/ODIHR 2010: 51). Courts must be independent from the execu-
tive and legislative branch, that is clearly separated, and states must protect judges 
from political influence on their decision making and establish objective criteria for 
their independent status (UN Human Rights Committee 1981-2014: GC 32, para. 19). 
Effectively, any complaint body should be (physically) accessible for all parts of the 
population, or there should be a procedure in place that allows potential complain-
ants to reach the body.
According to the Code of Good Practice, the powers and responsibilities of the various 
bodies involved should be clearly regulated by law in a way that avoids conflicting 
jurisdictions (Venice Commission 2002: Guidelines, section II.3.3.c). This means that:
 – neither the complainants nor the authorities should be able to choose the 
complaint body to avoid parallel complaint procedures, refusals to give a 
decision or “forum shopping”, that is the choice of a complaint body according 
to the complainant’s alleged opinion;
 – a higher electoral commission must be entitled to correct or annul decisions of 
a lower electoral commission (hierarchical structure of appeals).
In particular, the complaint body must be entitled to invalidate election results if irregu-
larities have affected them, that is the allocation of mandates. This does not always con-
cern the entire country or a whole constituency, but should be possible at polling station 
level, with only the vote in the concerned area being repeated (Venice Commission 2002: 
Explanatory Report, para. 101). However, the Court states in its judgment concerning 
the case Kovach v. Ukraine of 7 February 2008 (below) that respect for the will of the 
electorate demands the taking into consideration of specific circumstances.
d. Complaint procedure
The complaint procedure should be clearly and unambiguously regulated by law in 
line with the due process of law (OSCE/ODIHR 2010: 51), that is the following rights 
must be granted:
 ► the right to present evidence in support of the complaint (OSCE/ODIHR 2003b: 49);
 ► the right to a public and fair hearing on the complaint (Council of Europe 1950: 
Article 6(1); OSCE/ODIHR 2003b: 49);
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 ► the right to impartial and independent proceedings on the complaint (UN Human 
Rights Committee 1981-2014: GC 32, para. 21; International IDEA 2014a: 261);
 ► the right to an effective and speedy remedy that comprises the cessation of 
ongoing violations, reparations and interim measures (Council of Europe 1950: 
Article 13; UN Human Rights Committee 1981-2014: GC 31, paras. 15, 16, 19);
 ► the publication of the decision and its legal reasoning (Council of Europe 1950: 
Article 6(1); OSCE/ODIHR 2010: 51).
Non-compliance with some of these guidelines was found in the OSCE/ODIHR Election 
Observation Mission’s Final Report on the 2013 Presidential Election in Azerbaijan 
(below).
The complaint procedure should be as simple as possible and should not create unnec-
essarily high formal hurdles (Venice Commission 2002: Guidelines, section II.3.3.b). 
Special complaint forms and an information campaign may help voters to correctly 
file their complaints. The complaint procedures “should be clear, transparent and easily 
understandable” (Venice Commission/OSCE/ODIHR 2006: para. 55).
This was noted by the OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission’s Final Report on 
the 2012 Parliamentary Elections in Belarus (below).
The deadlines for the submission of complaints and subsequent decisions must be 
short, that is each step should not take more than three to five days at the first instance 
(Venice Commission 2002: Guidelines, section II.3.3.g). It should be noted that com-
plaint procedures must not retard the electoral process and that if a matter is ready 
for decision, this must be taken promptly, before the elections rather than afterwards 
Annulment of votes (the Court’s case law)
Facts: the applicant stood as a candidate in the 2002 parliamentary elections in Ukraine in a 
single-seat constituency. According to the first results, he had obtained a narrow majority of 
votes. However, the vote was annulled in four electoral divisions of the constituency on the basis 
of reports from observers acting on behalf of his main opponent. As a result, this opponent was 
declared elected for the constituency. The applicant complained about the invalidation of votes, 
the unfairness of the subsequent recount and the resulting disrespect for the will of the electorate.
Law: the Court stated “doubts as to whether a practice discounting all votes at a polling station at 
which irregularities have taken place, regardless of the extent of the irregularity and the impact on 
the outcome of the result in the constituency, can at all be seen as pursing a legitimate aim”. The 
Court further criticised the fact that no appeal body (inter alia the CEC and the Supreme Court) 
had discussed the conflict between sections of the domestic election law and the credibility of the 
different actors. In addition, no body explained why the found breaches “obscured the outcome 
of the vote … to such an extent that it became impossible to establish the wishes of voters”. 
The Court concluded “that the decision to annul the vote in four electoral divisions had to be 
considered as arbitrary and not proportionate to any legitimate aim pleaded by the Government”.
Conclusion: violation of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 (right to free elections).
Source: Kovach v. Ukraine (7 February 2008)
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-84959#{“itemid”:[“001-84959”]}
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(Venice Commission 2002: Explanatory Report, para. 95; International IDEA 2014a: 261). 
However, the periods have to be long enough to allow the complainant to prepare his 
or her complaint and to exercise defence rights, and they have to reflect the complexity 
of the matter, its electoral urgency and the nature of the complaint body.
A complaint procedure in line with the due process of law (Azerbaijan)
The EOM observed that the Baku Court of Appeals rejected without justification several 
appellants’ motions. For instance, appellants contested the invalidation of signatures by 
the CEC “on the grounds that they ‘appeared’ to have been falsified … they argued that the 
conjecture and speculation of the CEC working group [which examined the signatures] is 
not sufficient basis for denying registration. … The Baku Court of Appeals did not address 
the lawfulness of [this procedure] … as the basis for the CEC decisions”; rather, the decisions 
were upheld on the grounds that the candidate did not provide a sufficient number of 
signatures to be registered.
The EOM recommended consequently that “[a]ll arguments of appellants should be addressed 
by the courts in hearings and written decisions. In accordance with the law, decisions should 
include the argumentation of the court, to fully explain the legal basis for the decision. 
Rejections of appellants’ motions to review additional evidence should be clearly grounded 
in the law and procedural omissions made by the CEC should be addressed upon appeal.”
Source: OSCE/ODIHR EOM to Azerbaijan, Presidential Election 2013, Final Report, p. 18.
www.osce.org/institutions/110015?download=true
Avoiding inconsistent and formalistic interpretation of the law (Belarus)
The EOM found that the appeals review process was characterised by an inconsistent and 
formalistic interpretation of the law. For instance, the Supreme Court dismissed a complaint 
referring to a lack of legal permission to collect information that was presented as evidence.
The report recommended that “[e]lection commissions and courts should refrain from an 
overly formalistic approach to handling complaints. The law should not be interpreted to 
adversely limit the basic rights and freedoms as proclaimed by the Constitution and provided in 
international standards. Election commissions and courts should give thorough and impartial 
consideration to the substance of all complaints and appeals.”
Source: OSCE/ODIHR EOM to Belarus, Parliamentary Elections 2012, Final Report, p. 17.
www.osce.org/odihr/elections/98146?download=true
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11. ELECTION OBSERVATION
Election observation is a process that includes the systematic collection of information 
on all stages of the electoral process, their analysis as well as the reporting of results 
and consequently the issuing of recommendations. The concept of election observa-
tion is based on fundamental human rights such as “the rights to genuine elections, 
to participate in public affairs, to associate and to seek, receive and impart information 
in the electoral context”.109Election observations are an important means to assess the 
lawfulness of the electoral process, contributing to an increase of transparency and 
confidence in the electoral process.
An election observation can be conducted in various forms. However, this section mainly 
addresses professional observations through the deployment of election observation 
missions, which is a systematic approach to observation – as distinct from sporadic 
and isolated observations. Moreover, election observers can be either international or 
domestic groups (Venice Commission 2002: Explanatory Report, para. 87). This hand-
book focuses on the role of domestic election observers.
a. Accreditation of observers
The election observation process should be as inclusive as possible and states 
should encourage election observers to observe elections at each level (Venice 
Commission 2002: Guidelines, section II.3.2.a; OSCE 1990a: para. 8).
According to the Code of Good Practice, there are two types of domestic election 
observers (Venice Commission 2002: Explanatory Report, para. 87):
 ► non-partisan observers, including observers from domestic CSOs and possibly 
media representatives (OSCE/ODIHR 2003a: 76);
 ► partisan observers, who are often proxies of political parties or candidates.
In practice the distinction between them is not always obvious (Venice Commission 2002: 
Explanatory Report, para. 87). Unless specific mention is made to either group, the 
expression “domestic observers” shall include both party and non-partisan observers 
(Venice Commission 2009: para. 9).
To enable election observers to perform their tasks, a process needs to be put in place 
for their accreditation. This process should be simple, transparent, timely and guided 
by objective and reasonable criteria (European Commission 2008: 74; International 
IDEA 2014a: 155). It should allow for the accreditation of an appropriate number of 
observers (OHCHR 1994: para. 128) to increase confidence while ensuring it does not 
lead to overcrowding in places such as polling stations. There should be a timely remedy 
against the refusal of an accreditation (Council of Europe 1950: Article 13; OHCHR 1966: 
Article 2(3); International IDEA 2014a: 156).
10. See the Global Network of Domestic Election Monitors (GNDEM), available at www.gndem.org/
aboutgndem, accessed 21 July 2016.
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b. Purposes and tasks of an election observation mission
A well-structured or well-organised observation of elections may raise the transparency 
of and the electorate’s confidence in the entire electoral process since the presence of 
accredited election observers allows for public scrutiny and might discourage electoral 
violations such as fraud or voter intimidation (OSCE/ODIHR 2003a: 76; International 
IDEA 2014a: 152). Any election observation should aim to assess the compliance 
with domestic legislation and with international election standards (International 
IDEA 2014a: 152).
An election observation might provide valid evidence as to whether elections were 
conducted lawfully and are as such particularly valuable in developing democracies 
(Venice Commission 2002: Explanatory Report, paras. 86, 89). An accurate observation 
comprises all aspects and stages of the electoral process before, during and after elec-
tion day (ibid.: Guidelines, section II.3.2.b). Particularly, it should cover:
 ► the assessment of the election and election-related legislation;
 ► the assessment of whether the authorities and especially the EA maintain an 
impartial role and if fundamental human rights are granted to contestants 
and voters;
 ► the registration of candidates and voters;
 ► the election campaign and media coverage;
 ► the distribution and storage of voting material;
 ► the processes of voting, counting and tabulation as well as the announcement 
of results (ibid.: Explanatory Report, para. 88);
 ► the handling of electoral complaints.
Typical tasks of observers besides mere observation are the conduct of voter education 
activities, promotion of codes of conduct for contestants and the exercise of parallel 
vote tabulation (European Commission 2008: 74). The exact extent of election obser-
vations should be regulated by law (OSCE 1990a: para. 8).
c. Observers’ rights
According to Article 11 of the Convention, observers must be granted the freedom to 
associate, including the right to form and join a domestic observation organisation. 
Once observers are accredited, states should recognise them and facilitate their work 
(The Carter Center 2014: 156). Additionally, the EA should co-operate with election 
observers, for example by providing them with relevant information, holding 
joint meetings or implementing corporate voter education activities (European 
Commission 2008: 74).
Freedom of movement must be guaranteed to observers in all areas where elections 
occur as well as freedom of access to all steps connected with the electoral process 
(Venice Commission 2009: Guidelines, sections 1.4, 1.5; International IDEA 2014a: 152). 
The law should only impose reasonable restrictions and be very clear about the places 
where observers are not allowed to observe in order to avoid inconsistent interpretations 
(Venice Commission 2002: Explanatory Report, para. 91; OHCHR 1994: para. 99).
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Observers must also be granted security of person, that is freedom from physical or 
mental intimidation and coercion (International IDEA 2014a: 152).
An example of the violation of observers’ rights was described in the OSCE/ODIHR Election 
Observation Mission’s Final Report on the 2012 Parliamentary Elections in Belarus.
Moreover, states must grant to observers the freedom of expression that entails the 
freedom to seek and receive information according to Article 10(1) of the Convention. 
Specifically, observers should be free during the entire electoral process to contact 
people (particularly officials, voters, contestants and media representatives), to take notes 
and report to their organisation (UN 2003: Article 10(a), 13(b); Venice Commission 2002: 
Explanatory Report, para. 90). They should have full access to necessary documents 
upon request (Venice Commission 2009: Guidelines, section 1.4, 1.7; UN Human Rights 
Committee 1981-2014: GC 25, para. 20; CIS 2002: Article 15.8). Observers should be 
entitled themselves to appeal against the decisions, actions or omissions of the EA 
(CIS 2002: Article 14.3).
d. Observers’ responsibilities
In order to be credible, election observers should adhere to certain obligations. First of all, 
observers should respect the law and should not obstruct the election process (Venice 
Commission 2009: Guidelines, section 2; CIS 2002: Article 15.9). Furthermore, observers 
must not interfere and should be politically impartial while observing (International 
IDEA 2014a: 151; OSCE 1990a: para. 8).
To make sure that election observers know and understand their rights and duties, they 
should undergo specific training, as emphasised in the findings of the OSCE/ODIHR 
Election Observation Mission’s Final Report on the 2012 Parliamentary Elections in 
Georgia (below).
Observers must fulfil their tasks in a non-discriminatory way (International 
IDEA 2014a: 151). Finally, they are obliged to report on their observation findings 
accurately and objectively (European Commission 2008: 74; CIS 2002: Article 15.9), 
with an aim to have their findings, suggestions and recommendations implemented 
by the authorities, including the EA.
Security of election observers (Belarus)
“The OSCE/ODIHR EOM noted several cases of alleged intimidation of citizen observers. For 
instance, on 23 August, the vehicle of Yuri Novikov, a local co-ordinator of the For Fair Elections 
campaign in Mogilev, was searched by the police and observer-training materials were seized. 
On 24 September, 17 members of the citizen observer group, Election Observation: Theory 
and Practice, were detained and had their fingerprints taken at a police station in Minsk, 
although no charges were brought against them.”
Source: OSCE/ODIHR EOM to Belarus, Parliamentary Elections 2012, Final Report, p. 18.
www.osce.org/odihr/elections/98146?download=true
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Observers’ duty to maintain impartiality (Georgia)
The EOM noted 40 cases of undue influence of authorised people in the processes in polling 
stations: “party proxies or citizen observers [were] interfering in the voting process or intimi-
dating voters. In several instances civil society observers were openly naming themselves as 
representatives of a certain candidate or a party or otherwise displaying bias.”
The EOM therefore recommended: “Civil society organizations, political parties and candidates 
should ensure that their representatives and proxies in polling stations receive comprehensive 
training to ensure respect for provisions prohibiting observer interference in the voting and 
counting processes and maintain impartiality when carrying out observation.”
Source: OSCE/ODIHR EOM to Georgia, Parliamentary Elections 2012, Final Report, p. 24.
www.osce.org/odihr/elections/98399?download=true
Page 100 ► Using international election standards
El
ec
tio
n 
ob
se
rv
at
io
n
(s
ta
nd
ar
ds
 a
nd
 g
oo
d 
pr
ac
tic
es
)
O
SC
E/
O
D
IH
R 
EO
M
 
Re
fe
re
nc
e 
(fi
na
l r
ep
or
ts
)
Ac
cr
ed
ita
tio
n
N
at
io
na
l a
nd
 in
te
rn
at
io
na
l o
bs
er
ve
rs
 sh
ou
ld
 b
e 
al
lo
w
ed
 to
 p
ar
tic
ip
at
e 
as
 w
id
el
y 
as
 p
os
sib
le
 
an
d 
w
ith
ou
t h
in
dr
an
ce
 in
 a
n 
el
ec
tio
n 
ob
se
rv
at
io
n.
Be
la
ru
s 2
01
2,
 p
. 1
8
U
kr
ai
ne
 2
01
2,
 p
. 2
4
Az
er
ba
ija
n 
20
13
, p
. 1
9
U
kr
ai
ne
 M
ay
 2
01
4,
 p
. 2
2
O
nl
y r
ea
so
na
bl
e 
re
st
ric
tio
ns
 sh
ou
ld
 a
pp
ly
 fo
r t
he
 a
cc
re
di
ta
tio
n 
of
 o
bs
er
ve
rs
 a
nd
 le
ga
l r
eg
ul
a-
tio
ns
 sh
ou
ld
 b
e 
cl
ea
r a
nd
 u
na
m
bi
gu
ou
s.
Ar
m
en
ia
 2
01
2,
 p
. 1
7
Az
er
ba
ija
n 
20
13
, p
. 2
0
A 
m
an
da
to
ry
 te
st
 fo
r d
om
es
tic
 e
le
ct
io
n 
ob
se
rv
er
s t
ha
t h
as
 to
 b
e 
pa
ss
ed
 to
 b
e 
ac
cr
ed
ite
d 
m
ig
ht
 b
e 
ov
er
ly
 re
st
ric
tiv
e 
sin
ce
 tr
ai
ni
ng
 o
f o
bs
er
ve
rs
 is
 so
le
ly
 th
e 
ta
sk
 o
f t
he
ir 
or
ga
ni
sa
tio
n.
Ar
m
en
ia
 2
01
2,
 p
. 1
7,
 2
8
O
ve
rc
ro
w
di
ng
 in
 a
 si
ng
le
 p
ol
lin
g 
st
at
io
n 
be
ca
us
e 
of
 th
e 
pr
es
en
ce
 o
f s
ev
er
al
 o
bs
er
ve
rs
 o
f o
ne
 
gr
ou
p 
sh
ou
ld
 b
e 
av
oi
de
d.
G
eo
rg
ia
 2
01
3,
 p
. 2
0
Pu
rp
os
es
 a
nd
ta
sk
s 
Th
e 
pa
rt
ic
ip
at
io
n 
of
 e
le
ct
io
n 
ob
se
rv
er
s c
an
 e
nh
an
ce
 th
e 
tra
ns
pa
re
nc
y o
f t
he
 e
le
ct
or
al
 p
ro
ce
ss
.
G
eo
rg
ia
 2
01
2,
 p
. 2
3
O
bs
er
va
tio
n 
sh
ou
ld
 n
ot
 b
e 
lim
ite
d 
to
 e
le
ct
io
n 
da
y 
its
el
f a
nd
 sh
ou
ld
 a
lso
 co
m
pr
ise
 e
le
ct
io
n-
re
la
te
d 
ev
en
ts
 b
ef
or
e 
an
d 
af
te
r i
t.
Be
la
ru
s 2
01
2,
 p
. 1
8
G
eo
rg
ia
 2
01
3,
 p
. 1
9
O
bs
er
ve
rs
’
rig
ht
s
El
ec
tio
n 
ob
se
rv
er
s s
ho
ul
d 
be
 e
ns
ur
ed
 u
nh
in
de
re
d 
ac
ce
ss
 to
 a
ll p
ar
ts
 o
f t
he
 e
le
ct
or
al
 p
ro
ce
ss
.
Be
la
ru
s 2
01
2,
 p
. 1
8
Az
er
ba
ija
n 
20
13
, p
. 2
3
U
kr
ai
ne
 M
ay
 2
01
4,
 p
. 2
2
U
kr
ai
ne
 O
ct
. 2
01
4,
 p
. 2
3
St
at
es
 m
us
t e
ns
ur
e 
th
e 
se
cu
rit
y 
of
 o
bs
er
ve
rs
.
Be
la
ru
s 2
01
2,
 p
. 1
8
O
bs
er
ve
rs
 sh
ou
ld
 b
e 
gi
ve
n 
co
pi
es
 o
f t
he
 p
ro
to
co
ls 
to
 v
er
ify
 th
ei
r n
um
be
rs
 a
nd
 a
llo
w
 fo
r 
eff
ec
tiv
e 
co
m
pl
ai
nt
s.
Be
la
ru
s 2
01
2,
 p
. 1
8
U
kr
ai
ne
 2
01
2,
 p
. 2
4
O
bs
er
ve
rs
’
re
sp
on
si
bi
lit
ie
s
El
ec
tio
n 
ob
se
rv
er
s s
ho
ul
d 
re
ce
iv
e 
ap
pr
op
ria
te
 tr
ai
ni
ng
 o
n 
th
ei
r d
ut
ie
s, 
es
pe
ci
al
ly
 o
n 
ac
tin
g 
im
pa
rt
ia
lly
 a
nd
 n
ot
 in
te
rfe
rin
g.
G
eo
rg
ia
 2
01
2,
 p
. 2
4
G
eo
rg
ia
 2
01
3,
 p
. 2
0
Th
e 
w
ith
dr
aw
al
 o
f a
n 
en
tir
e 
el
ec
tio
n 
ob
se
rv
at
io
n 
or
ga
ni
sa
tio
n 
sh
ou
ld
 n
ot
 b
e 
po
ss
ib
le
 if
 o
nl
y 
on
e 
of
 it
s o
bs
er
ve
rs
 v
io
la
te
s h
is 
or
 h
er
 d
ut
ie
s.
Ar
m
en
ia
 2
01
3,
 p
. 1
6
Fi
nd
in
gs
 sh
ou
ld
 b
e 
re
co
rd
ed
 ac
cu
ra
te
ly
 an
d 
im
pa
rti
al
ly
 as
 w
el
l a
s p
ub
lis
he
d 
in
 a 
tim
el
y m
an
ne
r.
Ar
m
en
ia
 2
01
2,
 p
. 1
7
 ► Page 101
Appendices
Appendix 1 – Abbreviations 
and acronyms
CEC Central Election Commission
CIS Commonwealth of Independent States
Court European Court of Human Rights
CSCE Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe
CSO Civil society organisation
GC General Comment
GRECO Group of States against Corruption
EA Electoral Administration
EMB Election management body
EOM Election Observer Mission
ICCPR International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
IDP Internally displaced person
IEOM International Election Observation Mission
International IDEA International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance
NGO Non-governmental organisation
ODIHR Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights
OSCE Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PEB Precinct Election Bureau
PEC Precinct Election Commission
TEC Territorial Election Commission
UDHR Universal Declaration of Human Rights
UN United Nations
UNCAC United Nations Convention against Corruption
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T he handbook Using international election standards, drafted in collaboration with civil society organisations from the countries of the Eastern Partnership, is a response to the 
recommendation set out in the 2015 report by the Secretary 
General of the Council of Europe entitled State of democracy, 
human rights and the rule of law in Europe. Its purpose is to improve 
the quality of domestic observation of electoral processes in the 
member states and to serve as a reference for domestic observers, 
primarily for core team members. 
At the same time, it may serve as a training tool for long-term 
and short-term observers and other electoral stakeholders 
who wish to familiarise themselves with international election 
standards (government officials, electoral administration, party 
representatives, judges, lawyers). 
The Council of Europe is convinced that this handbook will further 
promote the uniform application of Europe’s electoral heritage 
and of other international standards in its member states and 
beyond.
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